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Driving in the Fairway Incurs No
Penalty-: Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. and
Discriminatory Boundaries in the
Americans with Disabilities Act
Todd A. Hentges**
Even if you aren't having an extra good day, always count your
blessings. Be thankful you are able to be out on a beautiful
course. Most people in the world don't have that opportunity.
Fred Couples'
Introduction
It was predicted that by today's date Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 19902 (ADA) would have
created "more conflicts in implementation than any other aspect of
the ADA."3 Although this prediction has not come to pass,4 more
plaintiffs are seeking redress against places of public
accommodation than ever before as awareness of the statute
expands, and as judges broaden the definition of entities covered
by the Act.5
* United States Golf Association Rule 27-1 provides that "[i]f a ball is lost.., out of
bounds, the player shall play a ball, under penalty of one stroke, as nearly as
possible at the spot from which the original ball was last played." UNITED STATES
GOLF ASSOCIATION, DECISIONS ON THE RULES OF GOLF 430 (1993). "Out of bounds'
is ground on which play is prohibited," and may be delineated by a line, a stake, or
a fence. See id.
** J.D. expected 2000, University of Minnesota. B.A. 1997, San Diego State
University. The author would like to thank Rene6 Salazar for her structural
insights, and Rebecca Hansen, Bryce Nixon and Sarah Bigler for their editorial
assistance.
1. THE GOLFER'S BOOK OF WISDOM: COMMON SENSE AND UNCOMMON GENIUS
FROM 101 GOLFING LEGENDS 127 (Criswell Freeman ed. 1995).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
3. John W. Parry, Public Accommodations Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability, MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP., JAN.-FEB. 1992, at 92.
4. See infra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing the relative scarcity
of Title III suits to date in the Ninth Circuit).
5. Several circuits have expanded standing under Title III to plaintiffs seeking
redress for discrimination in services, even though the plaintiffs never availed
themselves of the covered entities' physical structures. See, e.g., Carparts Distrib.
Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating
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Casey Martin's suit against the Professional Golf Association
Tour (PGA Tour) attempts to further expand and vitalize Title III
of the ADA.6 His prayer for relief asked for nothing more than
access to the privilege of "opportunity" described by Fred Couples
in the opening quote to this Article. 7  Access to such an
opportunity, as stated in the preamble to the ADA, is the premise
on which the ADA's prescriptions and mandates are based.8
that establishments of public accommodation are "not limited to actual physical
structures"); Doukas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 950 F. Supp. 422, 427 (D.N.H.
1996) (holding that the broad wording of Title III mandates extension of the
chapter's coverage beyond mere access or availability of a good or service). See also
World Ins. Co. v. Branch, 156 F.3d 1142, 1143 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing the
scope of Title III as extending to insurance policies). But see Parker v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(construing Title III narrowly to encompass only goods and services that share
some nexus with a covered entity), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 871 (1998).
6. Sections 12101 and 12102 of the ADA introduce the underlying precepts of
the ADA and set out policy justifications that support the statute's enactment.
Section 12101(a) lays out Congressional findings concerning the disabled, including
the fact that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more physical or mental
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). This introductory statement goes on
to state that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities," and that "unlike individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have
often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination." 42 U.S.C. §§
12101(a)(2), 12101(a)(4) (1994). Section 12101(b) states that the purpose of the
ADA is "to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)
(1994). The language of Section 12101(b) also envisions "clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994). The chapter, in order to impose the
statute on the states, "invoke[s] the sweep of congressional authority, including the
power to enforce the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(b)(4) (1994). •
7. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (1994) (explaining that "individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including...
failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to lesser services,
programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities"); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8)
(1994) (emphasizing that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity [and] full participation.., for such
individuals"); 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (1994) (stressing that "the continuing
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people
with disabilities the opportunity to compete on an equal basis and to pursue those
opportunities for which our free society is justifiably famous"). Congress also
described the disabled as a "discrete and insular minority." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7)
(1994). This language follows that of Justice Stone's famous statement in United
States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See also Robert J.
Adelman, Has Time Run Out for the NCAA? An Analysis of the NCAA as a Place of
Public Accomnodation, 8 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 79, 89-90 (1997)
(explaining the implications under the ADA of Congress's description of the
disabled as a "Carolene" class). The ADA attempts to invoke and expand on
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Martin deserves protection under the ADA because he suffers
from an impairment that substantially limits his ability to perform
a major life activity.9 This disability derives from a venous
malformation that curtails blood circulation in his lower right
leg.' 0 It limits Martin's ability to walk normal distances and
protections afforded "Carolene" classes by mirroring prior statutory language found
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7963 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
9. The ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on
the basis of [a] disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of
public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994). "Disability" is defined as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). See also infra
notes 151, 153 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA's definition of
"disabled"). Once an individual is correctly described as "disabled" under the ADA's
definition, then the protections of the ADA's enforceable chapters come into play.
Title I deals with employment situations, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994 &
Supp. III 1997), Title II covers public services, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, 12141-
12147 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), and Title III addresses public accommodations and
services operated by private entities, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997). Title IV covers telecommunications, see 47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997), and Title V contains "miscellaneous provisions," see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-
12211 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Title V's miscellaneous provisions address such
issues as state immunity under the 11th amendment, see 42 U.S.C. § 12202,
prohibitions against retaliation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12203, and the imposition of
attorney's fees against the losing party, see 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
10. See Lisa Schnirring, Casey Martin's Case: The Medical Story, THE
PHYSICIAN & SPORTSMEDICINE, April 1998, at 15. Martin's complaint alleged that
he suffers from Klippel-Trenaunay-Weber Syndrome. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.
(Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or. 1998). The PGA Tour did not contest
this allegation for purposes of summary judgment, see id., but the court's opinion
on the merits distinctly avoided mention of the alleged syndrome. See Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or. 1998). A recent article
discussing Martin's claimed disability sheds light on the court's pointed failure to
mention the syndrome in its opinion on the merits:
It has been widely reported that Martin has KT syndrome, a combined
vascular disorder that is characterized by cutaneous capillary
malformations (port-wine stain), bony and soft-tissue hypertrophy, and
venous malformations. But of these three manifestations, Martin has only
venous malformations .... Patients are considered to have KT syndrome
if they have two of the three features... [so] [i]t's acceptable to say
[Martin] has a KT-like vascular anomaly, but he doesn't have KT
syndrome.
Schnirring, supra, at 15 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Compare the
court's opinion on the merits, which focused on Martin's personal condition, and not
on the disease:
[Martin's] medical records reflect a 25-year old male with a rare congenital
vascular malformation of the right lower extremity which has led to,
number one, chronic pain secondary to vascular engorgement and
progressive loss of bone stock... ; number two, a documented sleep
disorder secondary to chronic pain which leads.., to an exhaustion
syndrome; number three, the need to wear two compression stockings at
all times; number four, it has resulted in marked muscular atrophy and
2000]
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durations, and as a result, he requires the assistance of a
motorized cart to compete.11 Martin had enjoyed considerable
success as a college and low-level tour golfer despite this
impairment. 12  Now he wants to participate in PGA Tour-
sponsored competitions. The PGA Tour, however, wants to deny
him the assistance of a motorized golf cart, an accommodation to
which other PGA Tour competitors do not have access. 13
Martin's case, this Article proposes, is a strong one. He
meets the statutory definition of disabled, 14  his proposed
accommodation is not unreasonable' 5 and allowing him the
provision of a golf cart would not fundamentally alter PGA Tour
competitions.' 6 Martin also has popular sentiment on his side; his
lawsuit, Martin v. PGA 'Tour, Inc.,17 has received substantial
media coverage, much of it positive.'8
weakness in the right calf, number five, it has affected his knee through
multiple intra-articular bleeds, causing [painful] abnormalities... ; and
number six .... it has resulted in a weakened tibia which is at risk for
fracture and potential limb loss and/or serious post-fracture complications.
Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1244. The PGA Tour did not contest that Martin has a
disability as defined by the ADA. See id.
11. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1249 (reviewing testimony of Dr. Jones, who
stated that "[b]y August 1996 at the age of 24, Casey reported to me that he was
having tremendous difficulty with ambulation... [and] great difficulty walking 18
holes of golf'). The court concluded that "Casey Martin cannot walk... [a golf]
course, and only a cart will permit him to compete on the Nike Tour." Id. at 1250.
12. Martin was a teammate of Tiger Woods at Stanford University and in 1998
he finished 29th in Nike Tour earnings with $81,937. See Don Cronin, For The
Record, USA TODAY, May 4, 1999, at 11C. Martin also won the Lakeland (Nike
Tour) Open. See id. During his sophomore year at Stanford his team won the
NCAA golf championship, see Tom Cunneff, Great Golf 101, GOLF MAG., September
1, 1998, at 86-87, and he recently "made some birdies and got in [Tiger Woods's]
pocket," see Ron Sirak, Els Limps Into U.S. Open, Martin Rolls In, THE STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER, June 17, 1998, at M1 (internal quotations omitted). On
October 25, 1999, Martin ended the Nike Tour in fourteenth place, earning the
right to compete on the PGA Tour in the year 2000. See Associated Press, It's
Close, But Martin Gets PGA Card, LA. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at D3.
13. See infra note 84 (describing the PGA Tour's "Local Rule" which requires
that competitors walk the golf course during competition).
14. See infra Section IVA.
15. See infra Section IV.C.
16. See infra Section IV.C.
17. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998)
(opinion on motions for summary judgment); Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II),
994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998) (opinion after conclusion of bench trial).
18. A September 20, 1999 search of WESTLAW's AllNews database revealed
more than 5,000 stories dealing with Casey Martin and his request for reasonable
accommodation. In contrast, a search conducted the same day for a recently-
decided case in the Northern District of Indiana, Olinger v. United States Golf
Ass'n., No. 3:98-CV-252RM, 1999 WL 454719 at *1 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (also dealing
with a disabled golfer seeking the accommodation of a cart to compete in a
professional tournament) revealed only 213 stories mentioning the plaintiff. The
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The Ninth Circuit, however, charged with reviewing the PGA
Tour's appeal, will likely ignore the ADA's remedial purpose and
overturn the lower court's decision favoring Martin.19 This is
because legal analysis under current Supreme Court philosophy
forces the conclusion that the area of competition maintained by
the PGA Tour during a professional golf event cannot be construed
as a place of public accommodation. 20
This outcome, textualists will argue, is mandated not only by
the plain language of the statute, but also by Department of
Justice (DOJ) regulations implementing Title III of the ADA, to
which courts must show deference. 21 Congress, on the other hand,
intended that the ADA would eradicate any remaining vestiges of
discrimination that persisted beyond the reach of the
Rehabilitation Act.2 2 To effectuate this broad-based remedial
intent, barriers to entry for the disabled must be removed in all
social arenas, including professional sports. Martin has the skills
necessary to compete against the best players in golf.23 This is
exactly the situation that the ADA is designed to cover. When an
individual is limited by a disability but is otherwise qualified,
public policy mandates that accommodations be made to allow the
disabled individual's participation.
Federal courts of appeal, however, forced to follow the
Supreme Court's preference for textualist analysis, must show
deference to a statute's plain language. The problem is that
textualist adherence to plain language precludes courts from
considering an older and perhaps more important Supreme Court
canon-remedial statutes must be construed broadly.24 By failing
Indiana court granted Olinger an injunction allowing the use of a cart prior to the
1998 qualifying rounds for the United States Open golf tournament. See Olinger,
1999 WL 454719, at *2. Martin's similar injunction was granted only a few months
earlier, prior to the 1998 "Q-School" qualifying tournament for the PGA Tour. See
Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1243.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra note 213 (discussing the appropriate level of deference to be given
administrative agency regulations under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
22. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (describing the findings and
purpose of the ADA as articulated by Congress). The text of the Rehabilitation Act
may be found at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1994 & Supp. I1 1997).
23. See supra note 12 (mentioning some of Martin's past and current golfing
successes).
24. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 240 (1989) ("[A] simple, broad
characterization of... claims best fits the statute's remedial purpose"); Ramsey v.
Tacoma Land Co., 196 U.S. 360, 362 (1905) ("Obviously, in a remedial statute ....
the term 'citizens' is to be considered as including state corporations, unless there
20001
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to broadly construe the ADA, textualism leads in Martin's case to
both a spurious interpretation 25 and the reversal of clearly
articulated congressional intent.26
Nonetheless, there are critics of a result favoring Martin.
These individuals decry the remedial construction argument,
proffering a "parade of horribles" (including wheelchairs rounding
third base and basketball players "handicapped" by weights) 27 that
shall certainly result from a decision that breaches the sanctity of
professional sports's autonomy. 28 Perhaps the most persuasive of
these slippery-slope arguments is one made in another context by
science fiction author Kurt Vonnegut. In his satirical story
Harrison Bergeron,29 Vonnegut describes a future government of
America that levels the playing field in almost every activity
imaginable, imposing brain inhibitors on the intelligent, placing
leg weights on top ballet dancers, and reducing the best boxers to
the use of one hand.30
Such scenarios are not only fiction, but are also alarmist.
Applying the ADA to professional sports merely requires that
sports organizations make an individualized inquiry into the
nature of the disability and the reasonableness of the
be something beyond ,the mere use of the word to indicate an intent on the part of
Congress to exclude them."); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 159
(1819) (commenting that "[o]ur interpretation of [a last will and testament] ought,
at least, to be as liberal as of a remedial statute"); infra note 183 (citing School Bd.
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19 (1986) for the proposition that
the disabled are entitled to far-ranging remedial acts).
25. Dean Roscoe Pound theorized that the "object of genuine interpretation is to
discover the rule of law which the law-maker intended to establish; to discover the
intention with which the law-maker made the rule, or the sense which he attached
to the words wherein the rule is expressed." Roscoe Pound, Spurious
Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381 (1907) (emphasis added). For Pound,
specific intent exhumed is genuine interpretation; purposeful ignorance of
legislative intent under the guise of strict adherence to a textualist interpretation
would be an incorrect (spurious) application of judicial power. See id.
26. See supra notes 6, 8 and accompanying text (explaining the remedial nature
of the ADA as articulated by Congress in the statute's findings and purpose).
27. See Trey Garrison, Court in Casey Martin Golf Case 'Slices' Up the
Constitution, DALLAS Bus. J. Feb. 23, 1998 (visited October 21, 1999)
<http://www.amcity.com/dallas/stories/1998/02/23/editoria12.html>.
28. The Libertarian Party has recently joined the "parade of horribles" side of
the argument, stating that "[i]f you think that the government will stop with
professional golf, you're probably protected by the ADA... because of your chronic
case of gullibility." Seen & Heard, GOLF MAG. (Mike Purkey ed.), May 1998, at 41-
42 (internal quotations omitted). The Libertarian Party queries: "Should Olympic
figure skating be limited to athletic, lithe young women.... or should Roseanne
Barr be allowed to compete-just to be fair?" Id. (internal quotations omitted).
29. See Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Harrison Bergeron, in ANIMAL FARM AND RELATED
READINGS (1997).
30. See Garrison, supra note 27. See also Vonnegut, supra note 29.
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accommodation requested. 31 As with all ADA-covered entities,
professional sports organizations would not be required to effect
fundamental alterations or incur undue burdens in
accommodating a disabled individual. 32 This Article argues,
therefore, that Martin should be allowed "reasonable
accommodation."
In general, the Article explores whether the ADA is
appropriately applied to rules of professional sports. Part I
addresses the specific holding and reasoning of the District of
Oregon in Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc.33 Part II examines Olinger v.
United States Golf Ass'n,34 a Northern District of Indiana case
decided subsequent to Martin which comes to opposite
conclusions. 35 Part III presents cases and principles that form the
analytical underpinning of student-athlete ADA litigation with
respect to athletics. 36 Part IV37 anticipates a textualist-based
resolution of the many issues raised by Martin, including a
proposed construction of major life activities, 38 private club
exceptions, 39 fundamental alterations 4° and places of public
accommodation. 41 Part V concedes that under a narrow textualist
interpretation the ADA might not apply to professional sports, but
proposes that the more appropriate analysis favors construing the
ADA broadly in order to implement its remedial purpose. 42 This
Article concludes that Congress, in the absence of a remedial
purpose interpretation by the court, must legislate so that disabled
individuals are allowed to participate in the ADA's promise of
equal opportunity.43
I. The District Court's Disposition of Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc.: The Little Remedial Purpose Engine That Could -
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. is a case of first impression for the
31. See infra Part IV. (arguing in favor of Martin's request for accommodation).
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See infra notes 44-93 and accompanying text.
34. No. 3:98-CV-252RM, 1999 WL 454719 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
35. See infra notes 94-117 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 119119-136 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 137-217 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 141-165 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 166-182 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 183-202 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 203-217 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 218-276 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 277-284 and accompanying text.
2000]
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Ninth Circuit.44 The court will determine whether the ADA's
prohibitions and mandates are properly applied to the rules of
competition for professional sports. In other words, the Ninth
Circuit must decide whether Congress, through the ADA, intended
to regulate "inside the lines" of professional competition. 45 A
decision favoring Martin could expand the scope of the ADA's
coverage by embracing and enhancing the statute's remedial
purpose.
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit will review the injunction
granted to Martin under Title III of the ADA by the Federal
District Court of Oregon. This injunction first allowed Martin the
use of a cart for the third round of the 1997 PGA Tour Qualifying
School.46 On the PGA Tour's motion for summary judgment, the
trial court found that the PGA Tour was a for-profit enterprise
that operated a place of public accommodation and extended the
injunction through the first two events of the PGA Tour-sponsored
Nike Tour.47 After a trial on the merits, the court held that
Martin was disabled under the ADA, 48 and that providing him
with a golf cart was a reasonable accommodation that did not alter
a fundamental aspect of the PGA Tour's competitive rules.49
A. The District Court's Rulings on the Parties'Respective
Motions for Summary Judgment
The PGA Tour's motion to dismiss was predicated on two
legal theories. First, it claimed to be a private club, and therefore
44. There has, however, been at least one case resolved in favor of the athlete
under an ADA claim in a lower court in the Ninth Circuit. See Schultz v. Hemet
Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that a young
child disabled by cerebral palsy should be reasonably accommodated by being
allowed to participate at a lower age group than that mandated by his date of
birth).
45. Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently heard the PGA Tour's
appeal, it has yet to issue an opinion. The Department of Justice filed an amicus
brief on behalf of Martin and the ADA, arguing that the government's ability to
enforce the ADA could be threatened if the PGA Tour wins its appeal. The
Department of Justice reasoned that walking has nothing to do with the skill it
takes to execute golf shots during a competitive golf tournament and the mere fact
that access is strictly controlled does not mean that a facility is not a place of public
acco, modation. See Michael Grunwald, U.S. Launches Drive for Disabled Golfer,
WASH. PoST, Aug. 19, 1998, at A2.
46. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin 1), 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1322 (D. Or.
1998).
47. See id. at 1323-27.
48. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1244 (D. Or.
1998).
49. See id. at 1253.
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exempt from the ADA's coverage. 0 Failing that, the PGA Tour
argued that it did not operate a place of public accommodation as
envisioned by the ADA.51  In response to the private club
argument, the District Court found the PGA Tour operated as a
"commercial enterprise."52 This derived from the fact that the
PGA Tour functioned as "an organization formed to promote and
operate tournaments for the economic benefit of its members."
53
As a promoter and organizer, the PGA Tour is "part of the
entertainment industry,"54 and generates revenue for its members
"in direct proportion to the public participation as spectators and
viewers of the Tour's tournaments."55
The court reasoned that "the relatively small membership of
the PGA Tour does not confer private status" when it selectivity is
"counterbalanced with the [PGA] Tour's purpose."56  This is
because creating revenue for members "scarcely seems to qualify
as the type of protect[ed] interest Congress had in mind" when it
excluded private clubs from coverage under the ADA.57 The court
used for its analysis United States v. Lansdowne Swim Club58 and
the seven variables described therein that are "commonly weighed
by the courts in determining whether an organization is a bona
fide private club." 59 Factors that the court determined weighed
against private club status included "genuine selectivity,"
'60






56. Id. at 1324. The court pointed out that the Seventh Circuit test focuses on
the purpose of the membership, and not sheer numbers, to determine private
standing under the Civil Rights Act. See id. The court then connected the Civil
Rights Act to the case at hand, stating that "the ADA and the Civil Rights Act are
interrelated in terms and application." Id.
57. Id. To support this proposition the court cited Quijano v. University Fed.
Credit Union, 617 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1980), which found that a credit union,
although non-profit, does not fall within the private club exception. Quijano looked
to Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language to find that
credit unions "exist for purely mercantile purposes and... are not clubs in any
sense of the word." Quijano, 617 F.2d at 133 (quoted in Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at
1324).
58. 713 F. Supp. 785 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
59. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1324. The Lansdowne test looks at the following
factors: (1) genuine selectivity; (2) membership control; (3) history of organization;
(4) use of facilities by nonmembers; (5) club's purpose; (6) whether club advertises
for members; and (7) whether the club is nonprofit. See id. at 1324-25.
60. The court found this factor weighed against private status for the PGA Tour
because eligibility requirements for membership on the Tour "are not designed to
screen out members based upon social, moral, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs, or
20001
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"membership control,"61 "use of facilities by nonmembers, 62 the
"club's purpose"63 and "whether the club is nonprofit."6 4 Factors
the court found insignificant to the determination of private club
status included "history of the organization"65 and "whether the
club advertises for members."66 The court therefore concluded that
any other criteria used to 4protect freedom of association values which are at the
core of the private club exemption." Id. at 1325 (citing Quijano, 617 F.2d 129;
Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jordan,
302 F. Supp. 370, 376 (1969)). The court pointed out that although membership in
the PGA Tour is "an extremely small percentage of those who participate in the
sport at recreational or other non-professional levels .... selectivity is inherent to
athletics, and does nothing to confer "privacy" to the organizations to which
professionals matriculate." Id. at 1325.
61. The court found this factor weighed against private status for the PGA Tour
because "only four members of the policy board ... are player directors," id. at 1325
n.4, and what little control over the organization this confers on the membership
"does little to make it or keep it 'private."' Id. at 1325. The court pointed out that
members of the PGA Tour only have voting rights as to replacements for existing
player-directors, with the slate of candidates chosen by the incumbent directors.
See id. at 1325 n.4. But more to the point, according to the court, was that the
membership ranks are both filled and vacated through performance on the golf
course, and not by vote of the current members. See id. at 1325. The court cited
Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 375 for the proposition that "consideration is given to
whether the existing members have any control over the admission of applicants
for membership." Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
62. The court found this factor "cuts against private club status" for the PGA
Tour because of the "heavy reliance by the Tour on public participation for the
purpose of generating revenue for the tour." Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. The
court also mentioned that there are "numerous nonmembers who participate in the
tournaments as vendors, reporters, score keepers, volunteers, and members of the
gallery." Id. This aspect was not given as much weight as the PGA Tour's reliance
on public participation as a revenue force, the latter of which is "of particular
force." Id. The court cited for support Smith v. YMCA, 462 F.2d 634, 648 (5th Cir.
1972) and Evans v. Laurel Links, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. Va. 1966). Both
cases involved seemingly private clubs that generated substantial subsistence
revenue from public revenue sources. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
63. The court found this factor "weighs heavily against private club status" for
the PGA Tour, relying without further elaboration on its earlier explanation of the
PGA Tour's "mercantile purpose." Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
64. The court found this factor, like the club's purpose, weighed against private
status for the PGA Tour. The court labeled the Tour as "nonprofit" even though it
found that "its fundamental purpose is to enhance profits for its members." Martin
I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
65. The court found this factor insignificant to the determination of private
status for the PGA Tour since "it clearly was not formed to evade the Civil Rights
Act or ADA-" Id. Central to the courtfs dismissal of this factor was that when an
organization is not a "sham" it merely tells us that it "is 'bona fide,' but not that it
is a 'private club."' Id.
66. The court found this factor insignificant to the determination of private
status for the PGA Tour since "[t]he Tour has no more need or incentive to
advertise for golfers than do the Chicago Bulls for basketball players." Id. The
court cited Wright v. Salisbury Club, Ltd., 632 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1980) for the idea
that organizations which advertise and solicit new members cannot fit within the
private club exception. This is because extensive media coverage of the PGA Tour
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the PGA Tour was not an exempt private club, and moved to the
PGA Tour's second argument, that it did not operate a place of
public accommodation.
The court began by looking to the ADA and found "golf
course" specifically listed as a place of "public accommodation." 67
It dismissed the PGA Tour's argument that only those areas
accessible to the public should be subject to the ADA, since "many
facilities that are classified as public accommodations are open
only to specific invitees." 68 As justification for its holding the court
reasoned that "people other than [the PGA's] own Tour members
are... allowed within the boundary lines of play during its
tournaments." 69  In addition, the PGA Tour's argument against
public accommodation status could not be "reconciled with the
inclusion of private schools, whose corridors, classrooms, and
restrooms are clearly not accessible to the public, on the list of
places of public accommodations." 70 The court therefore denied the
PGA Tour's motion for summary judgment and allowed Martin's
claims to go forward. 7'
has led to an existence "well known to even the most casual golfers and followers of
sports." Martin i, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
67. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1326; 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994).
68. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. The PGA Tour cited cases where "private
facilities do not lose their exempt status on the private portions of its facilities
simply by operating a discrete public accommodation area." Id. at 1326. Pointing
to Major League Baseball as an example of this proposition, it argued that "the
bleachers are subject to the ADA because that is where the public is seated, but the
dugout is not because the public is not allowed to mingle with the players therein."
Id. at 1327. The court rebutted this contention with several examples, including:
the disabled manager of a team (an organization could not "refuse to construct a
wheelchair ramp to the visitor's dugout to accommodate a disabled manager" on the
opposing team); a private country club's day care center that is open to the public
(the day care center may not "rope off a section for use only by the country club's
members and be exempt from the ADA within those boundaries"); and a federal
District of Oregon case, Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982
F. Supp. 698, 758-59 (1997) (listing examples of facilities that while exclusive in
invitation nonetheless operate places of public accommodation). See Martin I, 984
F. Supp. at 1327.
69. Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1327. The court's reasoning is emphasized by the
example of a disabled caddy hired by a member-golfer. The court rhetorically
asked, once the caddy "steps within the boundaries of the playing area of the golf
course-a statutorily defined place of public accommodation--does he step outside






B. The District Court's Disposition of Martin's Claims on
the Merits
After a bench trial, the court found that Martin fit the
statutory definition of "disabled."72 Because it had already found
on motion for summary judgment that the PGA Tour was a
covered entity, the court brushed aside the PGA Tour's reiteration
of the argument that the ADA does not apply to professional golf, 7 3
and instead moved directly to the PGA Tour's defense, that
allowing Martin the reasonable accommodation of a cart would
constitute a "fundamental alteration" of the nature of professional
golf.
7 4
The first factor the court reviewed as integral to a
"fundamental alteration" analysis was "reported cases wherein the
ADA has been applied to sports programs." 75 The court pointed
out that precedent concerning the ADA and athletics is sparse,
and that determinations in this area are both inconsistent and
closely tied to the facts at hand. 76 Nevertheless, the court distilled
72. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1243-44 (D.
Or. 1998). The court explained that Title III demands that "[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation." Id. at 1247. The court then quoted from the ADA's
underlying motivations. See id. at 1247-48 (quoting Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d
1480, 1483-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities" and that "Congress intended to protect
disabled persons not just from intentional discrimination but also from
thoughtlessness, indifference, and benign neglece')) (internal quotations omitted).
The court discussed the ADA's definitions of "physical or mental impairment," see
Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(1) (1998)) and "major life
activity," see Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(2) (1998)).
The court also took the time to distinguish "[tiemporary, non-chronic impairments
of short duration" from "disabilities." Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1248 (using factors
from Title I of the ADA, which include the nature and severity of the impairment,
the duration of the impairment, and the permanent or long-term impact). See also
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1997). This labored discussion of disability seems a bit
nonsensical, since Martin's disability was not an issue at trial. For a detailed
discussion of Martin's particular impairment, see supra note 10.
73. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1244.
74. See id.
75. Id. at 1245.
76. See, e.g., McPherson v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding maximum age limit for high school athletics necessary, and
an individual assessment of petitioner's ability relative to other participants too
burdensome); Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th
Cir. 1995) (same); Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d
926 (8th Cir. 1994) (same); Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997)
(finding NCAA "core course" requirement essential, and noting that the NCAA rule
already allows for an individual assessment of petitioner's relative abilities);
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from these cases the principle that courts must examine "the
purpose of each of the rules in question to determine if the
requested modification was reasonable."77
The court noted as a second contributing factor that even
though professional sports enjoy a higher profile and better
competition than high school and collegiate level sports, "the
analysis of the issues does not change from one level to the next."78
This is because interscholastic "athletic associations have just as
much interest in the equal application of their rules and the
integrity of their games as do professionals."79
The final contributing factor was the ADA's failure to
recognize a distinction between sports organizations and other
entities. The court reasoned that "[b]usinesses and schools have
rules governing their operations which are of equal importance (in
their sphere) as the rules of sporting events."8 0 Under the ADA,
"[t]he key questions are the same: does the ADA apply, and may a
reasonable modification be made to accommodate a disabled
inividual?'8 1
Applying these precedents and policies to the case at hand,
the court found that accommodating Martin would not
fundamentally alter the nature of professional competition.8 2 This
result was based in part on the plain language of the United
States Golf Association's (USGA) Rules of Golf.8 3 Examining the
Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579 (M.D. Fla. 1995),
vacated as moot 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding high school age
requirement necessary, but an individual assessment required); Dennin v.
Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 913 F. Supp. 663 (D. Conn. 1996),
vacated as nmot 94 F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
77. Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1246. The PGA Tour's position on the issue was
that the court should examine whether the rule "defines who is eligible to compete
or [whether it is] a rule which governs how the game is played" (a procedural
versus a substantive distinction). Id. If the latter, then the rule cannot be modified
"without working a fundamental alteration of the competition." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. The court used the example that "if it is unreasonable to accommodate
Casey Martin's disability with a cart at the PGA Tour level because of its rules of
competition, it is equally unreasonable to so accommodate a similarly disabled
golfer at the high school level if the same rules were applicable." Id.
80. Id. This led to an assertion by the court that "the disabled have just as
much interest in being free from discrimination in the athletic world as they do in
other aspects of everyday life." Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 1252.
83. See id. at 1252-53. The Rules of Golf are published independently by the
United States Golf Association (USGA) and the Royal and Ancient Golf Club of St.
Andrews, Scotland (R&A). The Rules of Golf are general rules for all players, and
not Rules of Competition, such as those used by the PGA Tour.
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USGA Rules, the court placed great weight on the fact that no
prohibition against carts was anywhere to be found.8 4
The court then discussed the issue of fatigue as a
fundamental factor in professional golf, explaining that even with
a cart, Martin incurs the same level of fatigue as, if not greater
than, non-disabled golfers who are required to walk an entire
eighteen-hole course.85 The court discounted PGA Tour testimony
offered by several high-profile players,8 6 choosing instead to
discuss at length the testimony offered by plaintiffs witness, Nike
Tour Professional Eric Johnson.8 7 Johnson testified that walking
a golf course during competition is preferable, and involves little to
no fatigue.88 This echoed the testimony of plaintiffs expert
witness, Dr. Gary KIug, who equated the nutritional energy
expended in walking a golf course to "less than a Big Mac."8 9
Finally, the court proposed a hypothetical involving a blind
golfer and several of the USGA rules in an attempt to determine
whether the Rules of Golf could be subject to modification.90 This
hypothetical had little to do with PGA Tour Rules of Competition.
The court found, however, that it undermined the position of the
PGA Tour that an individualized assessment of the player's
disability need not be undertaken when evaluating the
reasonableness and potential burdens of accommodating a
84. The court did find, however, in Appendix I to the Rules of Golf, a proposed
stipulation for those entities wishing to restrict competition to walking. See id. at
1249. The PGA Tour adopted such a stipulation, expressly restricting players to
walking: 'Tlayers shall walk at all times during a stipulated round unless
permitted to ride by the PGA Tour Rules Committee." Id. As the court pointed out,
"[nlo waiver has ever been granted for individualized circumstances," and "when
the walking rule has been waived, it has been waived for all competitors." Id.
85. See id. at 1249-51.
86. See infra note 195 (discussing players who testified for and against Martin).
87. See Martin 11, 994 F. Supp. at 1251 nn.12-13.
88. See id. at 1250.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 1252. The court examined in detail Rule 6-4 of the Rules of Golf
(addressing the role of the caddie: "[tihe player may have only one caddie at any
one time, under penalty of disqualification"), Rule 8 (outlining what advice is
allowed during the round of play: "'[aidvice' is any counsel or suggestion which
could influence a player in determining his play, the choice of a club or the method
of making a stroke"), and Rule 8-1 (restricting players from offering advice to fellow
competitors: "a player shall not give advice to anyone in the competition except his
partner... [and] may ask for advice.., from only his partner or either of their
caddies"). Id. This hypothetical golfer would also be allowed modifications to the
Rules of Golf under the explicit language of the United States Golf Association's
pamphlet entitled, A Modification of the Rules of Golf for Golfers with Disabilities.
See id. The pamphlet makes allowances for the hypothetical blind golfer, allowing
her or him a "coach" in addition to the traditional caddie. See id. at 1252-53.
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petitioner's request for a modification of rules.9 1
In closing its evaluation of Martin's prayer for relief on the
merits, and as summation of the case, the court boldly announced
that the PGA Tour's rules were "not so sacrosanct" as the PGA
Tour might want to believe. 92 This led to the conclusion that the
PGA Tour must allow Martin his accommodation since it would
not work a fundamental alteration and "[t]he requested
accommodation of a cart is eminently reasonable in light of Casey
Martin's disability."93
II. Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n
Ford Olinger, a disabled professional golfer seeking access to
the prestigious United States Open Championship (U.S. Open),
recently joined Martin's attempt to expand the scope of the ADA.94
The Northern District of Indiana ruled after a two-day trial that
the United States Golf Association (USGA) operates places of
public accommodation and found that Olinger's request for the
accommodation of a motorized cart was reasonable. 95 Contrary to
Martin, however, the court held that modifying USGA rules to
allow Olinger a cart would fundamentally alter the nature of
USGA competition. 96 This Part explains the outcome of Olinger,
looking specifically to the court's place of public accommodation
and fundamental alteration analyses. 97
A. The USGA and Places of Public Accommodation
There are many factual differences between Ford Olinger's
situation and Casey Martin's. As the court noted, Martin's request
for injunctive relief encompassed "a series of multi-level weekly
tournaments," while Olinger sought access to a single event.98
91. See id. at 1253.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, No. 3:98-CV-252RM, 1999 WL
454719, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (ruling after trial); Olinger v. United States Golf
Ass'n, 52 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (ruling on in limine motion to exclude
the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness). References to the Olinger litigation
will be to the ruling on the merits unless otherwise indicated.
95. See Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *6-*7.
96. See id. at *11. See also id. at *1 (stating the USGA "has persuaded the
court that allowing the use of a golf cart would fundamentally alter the nature of
this particular tournament, either by eliminating the uniformity of rules common
to athletic events, or by changing the importance of a competitor's response to
fatigue").
97. See id. at *3, *7.
98. Id. at *6 n.4.
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Martin is a professional tournament golfer, while Olinger is a golf
professional.9 9 Furthermore, the parties in the two separate cases
presented different evidence, leading to different records before
the court.100 The two cases merge, however, on the issue of
whether a professional golf organization operates a place of public
accommodation.
The court's analysis of the place of public accommodation
issue began with the statute.'0 ' In deciding the question, the court
took time to note that "Congress chose to list places, not events or
activities, as public accommodation." 102  Conscious of this
distinction, the court found that the USGA and the U.S. Open
were not places, but events, and therefore were not directly subject
to the ADA. 108
The court went on, however, to determine that the USGA
operated places of public accommodation.104 The court based this
determination on the fact that the USGA "restrict[ed] the normal
operations" of its competitive events by "supervis[ing] the play,
provid[ing] the rules, officiat[ing] the play, set[ting] up the golf
course, and determin[ing] the groupings of the players and their
tee times."'10 5
The USGA's argument in response was that the area "inside
the ropes" of the U.S. Open was outside the purview of the place of
public accommodation language. 106 The court, however, refused to
99. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320 (D. Or. 1998);
Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *1; Nilon v. Philadelphia Section Profl Golfer's Ass'n,
No. 79-3013, 1979 WL 1707 *4 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (taking judicial notice of the
difference between a PGA Tour professional and a golf course professional).
100. See Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *6 n.4. This "different evidence"
distinction is a direct reference to the court's evidentiary ruling that excluded the
expert testimony of Dr. Gary Klug "for want of sufficient showing of reliability of
underlying scientific principles." Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *6 n.4. See also
Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 52 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (ruling on
defendant's in limine motion to exclude plaintiffs expert witness Dr. Gary Mug).
The district court in Martin relied in significant part on the testimony of the same
witness (Klug) that the Olinger court found unreliable. See Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or. 1998).
101. See Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *2-*3 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994) and
28 C.F.R. § 36.104) (1998)).
102. Id. at *3.
103. See id. at *3-*4. The court reasoned by analysis to come to this conclusion,
looking to other ADA cases involving Title III, and holding that "[t]he USGA, like
the youth hockey league, the professional football league, and the Boy Scouts of
America, is a membership organization and as such is not itself a place of public
accommodation." Id. at *4.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *5.
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recognize such a distinction, finding that the area of competition of
the U.S. Open was no different in kind or in form from situations
where student-athletes were protected by Title 111.107 In the
student-athlete cases, the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA) was found to exercise "enough control over the athletic
facilities.., to make the NCAA an operator of the facilities."108
The court found it persuasive that the "athletes in th[o]se cases
were the performers rather than the audience, just as the 6,881
golfers at the [U.S. Open] local qualifying events.., were the
performers."1 09 Because the "NCAA cases did not find Title III
limited by the roped-off, competitive portions of the field, court or
pool," the court held that "nothing supports a finding that the
USGA's barrier ropes limit Title III."110
B. The USGA and Fundamental Alterations
The court, in deciding the fundamental alteration issue, once
again began with the text of the statute. ' Noting the similarity
between the Rehabilitation Act and ADA language, and
recognizing the appropriateness of a parallel construction of the
two Acts, the court implicitly distinguished Martin, holding that
"[t]he proper inquiry... is not whether the requested
accommodation would amount to a fundamental alteration in the
game of golf .... but rather whether the requested accommodation
would constitute 'a fundamental alteration in the nature of a
program."'1 12
107. See id. (citing Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D.N.J. 1998); Tatum v.
NCAA, 992 F. Supp. 1114 (E.D. Mo. 1998); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96-C6953, 1996
WL 68000 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Butler v. NCAA, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233
(W.D. Wash. 1996)).
108. Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *5.
109. Id.
110. Id. After examining the NCAA cases, the court noted that the USGA also
advanced an argument that "organizers of championship-level competitions have
the legal right to define the rules for that competition." Id. at *6. Here is where
the Indiana court makes its only reference to the months-earlier Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc. decision, quoting it for the proposition that "the USGA's contention that
it alone may set the rules is simply another version of its argument that the USGA
is exempt from the provisions of the ADA, '[aind it is not." Id. (quoting Martin v.
PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Or. 1998)). It is the
author's opinion that the Olinger court mentions the Martin decision only once, and
then only for a bare assertion sans legal analysis, because of the convoluted and
laborious nature of the Oregon court's attempt at unraveling the issues. Although
the Olinger court arguably came to the wrong conclusion with regard to the
fundamental alteration issue, see infra Part V.C., its opinion is without question an
admirable explication of the issues.
111. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (1994)).
112. Id. at *7 (citation omitted). Compare supra notes 75-93 and accompanying
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Looking to the several reasons offered by the USGA in
support of their position, the court was persuaded first because
"the use of a cart can provide a golfer with a competitive
advantage over a golfer who walks,"113 and second because
"requir[ing] that someone be given the discretion to allow one
competitor a potential advantage denied to others would
fundamentally alter the nature of the competition." 4 The only
way to eliminate this second concern would be to create a situation
where all golfers must have the opportunity to ride, which would
in turn "remove stamina... from the set of qualities designed to
be tested in this competition." 15 Reasoning that the "set of tasks
assigned to the competitor in the U.S. Open includes not merely
striking a golf ball with precision, but doing so under greater than
usual mental and physical stress,"" 6 the court concluded that the
"accommodation Mr. Olinger seeks, while reasonable in a general
sense, would alter the fundamental nature of [U.S. Open]
competition." 117
III. Athletes, Athletics and the ADA
Although several spectators have requested that covered
entities comply with the ADA's accessibility requirements with
respect to watching professional sports,1 8 Casey Martin and Ford
Olinger are the only two athletes to claim that the ADA should
apply to the playing of professional sports.119 This Part explores
cases in which amateur student-athletes have tried to use the
ADA's broad mandates to gain access to interscholastic
competition. 120  These student-athlete cases divide into two
text (discussing the Martin court's analysis of the fundamental alteration defense).
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id. at*10.
115. Id. Here again the court's analysis is in direct contrast to the Martin
holding, an outcome that can be traced directly to the in limine exclusion of the
plaintiff's expert witness. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, 52 F. Supp. 2d
947 (N.D. Ind. 1999).
116. Olinger, 1999 WL 454719, at *11.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Stoutenborough v. NFL Inc., 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995);
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 759 (D. Or.
1997).
119. See supra Parts I. and II. (discussing Martin and Olinger, respectively).
120. Most suits arising under the ADA with regard to athletes have been
brought either against a high school athletic association, see, e.g., Frye v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass'n, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Florida High
School Activities Ass'n, 102 F.3d 1172 (11th Cir. 1997); McPherson v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass'n, 119 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1997); Sandison v. Michigan
High School Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026 (6th Cir. 1995); Pottgen v. Missouri State
[Vol. 18:131
DRIVING IN THE FAIRWAY
groups. The first group of cases involves disqualification from
participation based on eligibility requirements. The second group
of cases covers disqualification from participation based on the
threat of harm to the individual. 121
A. Disqualification Based on a Physical or Mental
Impairment
The typical scenario from the first group of cases involves an
individual who is either denied eligibility because he or she
exceeds the age requirement imposed on the sport, 22 or who is
disqualified from competition because of academic ineligibility. 123
As the District Court in Martin pointed out, these cases vary
widely in their resolutions. 124 Several avoid a ruling on appeal due
to the lapse of a case or controversy. 25 Among those cases that do
actually address the main issue, there is a conceptual division over
whether interscholastic sports can constitute a protected activity.
Some jurisdictions hold that interscholastic sports contribute
substantially to the major life activity of education. 126 The other
High School Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994), or against the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), see, e.g., Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101
F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996); Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Kan. 1995); Ganden v. NCAA, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21,
1996); Butler v. NCAA, No. C96-1656D, 1996 WL 1058233 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8,
1996); Bowers v. NCAA, 974 F. Supp. 459 (D.N.J. 1997) (ruling on preliminary
injunction). See generally Matthew J. Mitten, Enhanced Risk of Harm to One's Self
as a Justification for Exclusion from Athletics, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 189 (1998)
(discussing claims under the ADA with regard to high school and collegiate
athletics); Adam A. Milani, Can I Play?: The Dilemma of the Disabled Athlete in
Interscholastic Sports, 49 ALA. L. REv. 817 (1998) (same). See also Mark R. Freitas,
Applying the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to Student-
Athletes, 5 SPORTS L.J. 139 (1998); Robert J. Adelman, Has Time Run Out for the
NCAA? An Analysis of the NCAA as a Place of Public Accomnmdation, 8 DEPAuL-
LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 79 (1997).
121. See generally Milani, supra note 120 (discussing judicial precedent and
reasoning covering issues of disabled athletes and interscholastic sports).
122. See, e.g., Sandison, 64 F.3d at 1026. For a detailed bibliography of cases
involving high school athletes attempting to have their age-disqualified eligibility
reinstated, see John E. Theuman, Validity, Under Rehabilitation Act or Americans
with Disabilities Act, of Rules or Laws Limiting Participation in Interscholastic
Sports to Those Below Specified Age, 143 A.L.R. Fed. 567 (1998).
123. See, e.g., Bowers, 974 F. Supp. at 459.
124. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (describing the district court's
characterization of cases dealing with athletes and the ADA, and citing examples).
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass'n, 102 F.3d 1172
(11th Cir. 1997); Dennin v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 94
F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Indiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 16 F.3d 785
(7th Cir. 1994).
126. See, e.g., Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995)
(finding football a major life activity under the auspices of "learning"); Sandison,
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jurisdictions disagree, finding that interscholastic sports cannot be
considered a major life activity. 127 Although the split seems
irreconcilable, the relevant issues are clear: (1) whether the sport
itself is a major life activity; (2) whether the disabled student-
athlete is discriminated against "by reason of' the disability; and
(3) whether the student-athlete is "otherwise qualified" to
participate in the athletic endeavor. 12
B. Disqualification Based on Harm to One's Self
The typical scenario in the second group of student-athlete
suits involves disabled athletes declared ineligible to participate
based on the governing entity's fear that the individual will be
exposed to harm.129 While the regulations implementing the
Rehabilitation Act prohibited discrimination against persons able
to perform a function "without endangering the health and safety
of the individual,"'130 the ADA drops the reference to self-harm and
focuses exclusively on "threat[s] to the health or safety of other
individuals."13 This change in statutory language has led to a
863 F. Supp. at 489 (finding cross-country and track an "important and integral
part of the education of plaintiffs"). This determination is typically arrived at by
applying a subjective test that examines the sport from the viewpoint of the
student and the role the sport plays in their own personal education process. See
generally Milani, supra note 120, at 825-53 (describing differences in the courts's
determination of "major life activity," and explaining the differences between
subjective and objective analyses).
127. See, e.g., Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996)
(declining to "define the major life activity of learning in such a way that the
[Rehabilitation] Act applies whenever someone wants to play intercollegiate
athletics"). This determination is typically arrived at by applying an objective test
that examines the sport from the viewpoint of education in general.
128. See Milani, supra note 120, at 817-60 (evaluating case law relevant to
interscholastic athletes with physical or mental impairments).
129. See, e.g., Knapp, 101 F.3d at 473; Pahulu, 897 F. Supp. at 1387. For an
excellent overall discussion of the topic, see Mitten, supra note 120. See also
Milani, supra note 120, at 890-906 (discussing disabled athletes and their exclusion
from athletics based on harm to one's self).
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f) (1998).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 12113 (1994). See also Mitten, supra note 120, at 205-08, 221-
23; Milani, supra note 120, at 896-901. Further complicating the issue are the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's regulations implementing the ADA
which, following the language of the Rehabilitation Act, re-insert the reference to
self-harm. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1998) (stating that employers may require
that "an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the
individual or others"). Because professional sports organizations generally do not
receive federal funding, any claims by disabled professional athletes in this context
would probably be brought under the ADA. See Mitten, supra note 120, at 217-23
(discussing the ADA and the potential rights of disabled professional athletes
under its provisions with regard to harm to one's self).
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split among the courts over interpretation.13 2 The main issue,
however, once an initial determination of disability has been
made, remains constant-who should make an assessment of the
risk to the individual?13 3 To date, arguments answering this
question propose one of three separate resolutions: (1) defer to the
judgment of the team physician; 34 (2) defer to the judgment of the
athlete;13 5 or (3) conduct a de novo judicial review of the conflicting
medical prognoses.13 6
IV. Wearing "Textualist-Colored Lenses" to View the ADA
When Congress first promulgated the ADA, commentators
noted that the statute's expansive language was meeting
significant judicial resistance.137 Recently, however, a more liberal
reading of the ADA's terms has found favor in certain
jurisdictions. 138 But decisions that involve sports, as noted above,
132. See generally Mitten, supra note 120.
133. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 483.
134. See, e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 285 (1986)
(holding under the Rehabilitation Act that an exclusion may be based on "reasoned
and medically sound judgments"); Knapp, 101 F.3d at 484-85 (finding the
Rehabilitation Act to only require review of team physician's judgment fbr
reasonableness and rationality). See also Mitten, supra note 120, at 215-17
(arguing that "[a]ll things considered, the team physician medical judgment model
strikes the appropriate balance between an amateur athlete's interest in athletic
participation and the team or athletic event sponsors interest in protecting the
health and safety of participants").
135. See, e.g., Poole v. South Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J.
1980) (allowing wrestler's personal autonomy interest to prevail over schoors
paternalistic interest). See also Milani, supra note 120, at 890-906 (discussing
cases covering exclusion based on "threat to self' and arguing that "[i]f the student-
athlete can compete at the same level as his peers, a school has neither the duty
nor the right to bar a student from playing once it is satisfied that he and his
family know of the dangers involved and rationally reach a decision to continue
playing") (internal citations omitted); Mitten, supra note 120, at 221-23 (proposing
that for professional athletes it is proper to adopt "the athlete infermed consent
model... which would enable a professional athlete to choose to participate,
despite medical disqualification by a team physician, if other competent medical
authority clears him or her to play").
136. See, e.g., Knapp, 942 F. Supp. at 1191; Mitten, supra note 120, at 210 n.111
and accompanying text. See also Mitten, supra note 120, at 215-17 (examining the
judicial/medical fact-finding model employed by the lower court in Knapp).
137. See Walter Olson, Are Federal Judges Taming the ADA? Don't Count On
It., REASON, May 1998. Judges initially refused to enforce the ADA expansively:
"the broad protection promised by the ADA has been unfulfilled because of the
narrow way that judges and employers have interpreted the law"; "Judges are
holding plaintiffs up front to a very high standard"; "Recent court rulings have
actually made it tougher for employees to claim discrimination by narrowing the
definition of who is protected." Id.
138. See id. Several recent appellate decisions support this statement, including
that of an IRS agent declared legally disabled although corrective lenses gave her
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are limited in number and scope, and vary widely in their
justifications and dispositions. 3 9 None deal with professional
athletes and professional sports. A determination of the issues in
Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., as intimated in the Introduction to this
Article, will therefore likely accede to the modern Supreme Court's
tendency to "textualize" rather than "remedialize" statutory
interpretation.140
This Part looks to four major issues in Martin v. PGA Tour,
Inc., and applies modern Supreme Court precedent to their
determination. Major life activities, private clubs, fundamental
alterations and places of public accommodation will all be
addressed. This exercise reveals the most probable position that
the Ninth Circuit will take on appeal. Part V will immediately
follow and refute such a limited analytical perspective.
A. Major Life Activities
The first major issue in applying the ADA to professional
sports is a conceptual one-the proper relationship between
athletics and major life activities.1 4 1 The ADA defines disability as
"a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities."'142 Courts have looked at the
phrase in two separate ways with regard to sports, with one camp
holding that "major life activity" is defined in terms of the
individual, while the other camp evaluates "major life activity" in
terms of the activity itself.143 Although circuit courts are split in
this regard, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bragdon v.
20/20 vision, and that of a diabetic granted disabled status although medication
could control the symptoms of his illness. See id. Such decisions, however, were
recently limited by the Supreme Court's decision in Sutton v. United Air Lines, 19
S.Ct. 2139 (1999). See infra note 188 (describing the holding of Sutton, which
required that courts examine plaintiffs in their "present" state).
139. See supra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
140. There is a definite tension between textualist (language should be given its
plain meaning) and purposivist (remedial statutes should be construed broadly)
canons of construction. For a detailed explication of these types of head-butting
canons and counter-canons of construction, see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the
Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be
Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
141. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text (discussing the two
opposing views of major life activity as courts have applied it to the sports context).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1994).
143. An example of these two methods of determination would be the case where
a high school student petitions the court for a variance to play baseball. Some
courts will discuss whether high school athletics is properly described as part of the
major life activity of "learning," while other courts look to whether the opportunity
to participate in athletics itself is a "major life activity."
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Abbott, 144 when extended to athletics, cleanly resolves the issue.
The Supreme Court in Bragdon addressed an asymptomatic
HIV-positive woman's claim of discrimination within a "place of
public accommodation."'145 A 5-4 majority of .the Court, 146 in
deciding whether the woman was "disabled" under the ADA, held
that the human act of reproduction was a "major life activity" for
this particular plaintiff.147 The significant aspect of this holding,
with relation to the dispute over "major life activities," was the
Court's refusal to take into account the relationship between the
major life activity and the relief sought. 148
This refutes those decisions holding that athletics are per se
excluded from the realm of major life activities, 149 because under
Bragdon the court must determine whether an activity is "major"
without regard to the public's access to the activity. 150 Under this
analysis, Martin's impairment substantially limits his major life
activity of walking, 151 and the fact that he is limited in playing
professional golf is irrelevant. In other words, the relief sought is
not disallowed by the fact that the forum within which the relief
will be applied is not available to the average person. 152 This not
only makes logical sense, but is also in accord with Title I
144. 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
145. Specifically, a dentist's office. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2199. See also 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994).
146. Justice Stevens writes separately in favor of affirming the appellate court's
decision, but acquiesces to the Courts majority opinion commanding a remand to
the appellate court for further findings. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2213 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
147. See id. at 2207.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
150. Such comparisons to other individuals and the general populace should
therefore be confined to the analysis of whether the impaired major life activity is
"substantially limited."
151. The ADA's regulations echo those of the Rehabilitation Act, providing a
representative, though not exhaustive, list of major life activities such as "caring
for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working" that are covered under the language of the ADA.
Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998) with 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(2) (1998) (using the
same definition to describe what constitutes a major life activity).
152. The implication is that cases like Pahulu v. University of Kansas, 897 F.
Supp. 1387 (D. Kan. 1995), which look to the positive impact of the sport on the
athlete's ability to learn, are incorrect in their subjective analysis of the situation.
A more appropriate approach, under the Bragdon standard, is to determine if the
individual's disability (in Pahulu's case a learning disability) affects the major life
activity of learning by itself, exclusive of the relief prayed for. Learning disabled





With this in mind, the Ninth Circuit's determination of
whether Martin is disabled rests on his having an impairment
that substantially limits at least one of his major life activities. As
the District Court correctly noted, Martin suffers from a physical
impairment. 54 This impairment is neither intermittent nor
ephemeral, 155 but is rather a permanent physical malformation
with attendant chronic pain that will most likely result in
amputation of Martin's lower right leg. 156 Under regulations
implementing both the Rehabilitation Act 157 and the ADA,158 any
physiological disorder affecting the musculoskeletal system
qualifies as an impairment. 159  Therefore, Martin's venous
malformation qualifies as a physical impairment, and he is
153. Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment against any
"qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in
regard to the... terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §
12112(a) (1994). The statute provides that "job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, [and] job
training" are covered by the section's language. Id. To determine the disabled
status of an individual with regard to discrimination within the place of
employment, courts may look to the major life activities such as "caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning,
and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998). They are not limited to looking at the
major life activity of working, even though working is the arena within which relief
is being sought.
154. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1248 (D. Or. 1998).
155. 'Temporary, non-chronic impairments of short duration, with little or no
long-term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities under the ADA." Id.
(citing Sanders v. Arneson Prods., 91 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1996)).
156. See Martin II, 994 F. Supp. at 1243-44.
157. See 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1998). Discrimination against any "otherwise
qualified individual" with a disability is generally prohibited by Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. To be "qualified," a handicapped person must meet "the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of program services." 28 C.F.R. §
42.540(1)(2) (1998). As an attempt to extend the civil rights umbrella of protections
to the disabled, its purview encompasses any "program or activity" receiving federal
financial assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1998). The statute defines "program
or activity" as any "department, agency ... or other instrumentality of a State." Id.
The Supreme Court, in interpreting this language, held that the Rehabilitation Act
guarantees "meaningful access" to programs or activities falling within the Act's
statutory language: "Mo assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in
the ... program or benefit [receiving Federal financial assistance] may have to be
made." Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985). The Rehabilitation Act may
be used in the ADA context, since Congress, in enacting the ADA, specifically
placed the newer and more expansive statute in congruence with the older
Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994). The ADA must therefore be
read as providing "at least as much protection as ... the regulations implementing
the Rehabilitation Act." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, -, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202
(1998).
158. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (1998).
159. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct at 2202.
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properly considered disabled under the ADA.
The question remaining is whether Martin's physical
impairment substantially limits the major life activity in
question.160 As the Supreme Court has said, "[t]he Act addresses
substantial limitations on .major life activities, not utter
inabilities."'161 Although in Bragdon the chance of passing on the
HIV virus to a child through the birth-process was as low as eight
percent, this limitation was nonetheless deemed significant
enough to constitute a substantial limitation. 162  Factors
contributing to the Court's finding included potential added costs
such as supplemental insurance, long-term health care and
therapy. 163
Martin's physical malformation has resulted in an
impairment that substantially limits his ability to both work and
walk. When Martin removes the two layers of compression
stockings from his right leg, swelling and discoloration
immediately result. 64  Furthermore, although not explicitly
addressed by the trial court, it is easy to imagine that Martin has
incurred significant financial burdens in the form of additional
health and insurance expenses. Therefore, Martin's impairment
substantially limits the major life activity of walking, and he
qualifies as disabled under the ADA.165
160. See id. at 2205-06.
161. Id. at 2206. The Court also stated that "[w]hen significant limitations
result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the difficulties are not
insurmountable." Id.
162. See id. As the court noted in its opinion, definitions of "disability" and
"major life activity" are described in regulations promulgated by various federal
agencies, see, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 84.30) (1998); 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b) (1998), but
"substantially limits" is not so easily defined. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2205.
Emphasizing the absence of regulations describing what constitutes a substantial
limitation, the Court held that the ADA addresses "substantial disabilities," and
not "utter disabilities." See id. at 2206. As illustration, the Court pointed out that
"the disability definition does not turn on personal choice." Id. at 2207. When
significant limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met "even if the
difficulties are not insurmountable." Id. (The Court's evaluation of the term
"substantial" is not revealed in quantifiable terms, but rather by somewhat circular
reasoning-significant limitations are substantial limitations.). The Court then
conclusively stated that plaintiffs disability fell within the ADA's guidelines. See
id. The Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas took umbrage at
the majority's lack of analytic methodology in evaluating this final prong. See id. at
2215-16 (Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). The
dissent, however, offered no assistance, other than to state that plaintiff must show
on the record that her "major life activity" has been "substantially limited." See id.
163. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2215-16.
164. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1243-44 (D.
Or. 1998).
165. Although not necessary under this analysis, because Martin is attempting
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B. Private Club Exemptions
A second issue in the application of the ADA in the
professional sports context is in the definition of "private club."
Title III of the ADA, outlining public accommodations, defines the
term with reference to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which exempts
places "not in fact open to the public."1 66 Title I, which discusses
employment, provides a little more direction, defining the term
to work as a professional golfer, the Ninth Circuit may examine whether the major
life activity of working is substantially limited by Martin's impairment. From a
public policy remedial purpose standpoint, the result should remain the same-
even though Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines
implementing Title I state that an individual is not substantially limited in
working if she or he "is unable to perform a specialized job or profession requiring
extraordinary skill, prowess, or talent." 29 C.F.R. § 1630, Appendix § 1630.20)
(1998). This is because such a "[s]trict application of the 'substantially limits a
major life activity' requirement can lead to the result that certain physically
impaired athletes [like the blind or the deaf] are covered by the ADA, whereas,
others [like Martin or the hypothetical pitcher below] are not." Mitten, supra note
120, at 219-20. The result should remain the same even though those same
guidelines set an example of a non-covered disability with regard to professional
sports: "a professional baseball pitcher who develops a bad elbow and can no longer
throw a baseball." 29 C.F.R. § 1630, Appendix § 1630.20). This is because "[t]here
is no principled justification for protecting some physically impaired professional
athletes under the ADA, but not others." Mitten, supra note 120, at 219-20.
Finally, the result should remain the same even though Martin, much like the
professional baseball player in the example, possesses a specialized skill. This is
because for a professional athlete the "many long years of training and commitment
constitute a major life activity." Mitten, supra note 120, at 219-20.
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(e) (1994). Title III's exact language is that an
exemption from coverage exists for "private clubs or establishments exempted from
coverage under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(e))." 42
U.S.C. § 12187 (1994). Private clubs or establishments under Title II of the Civil
Rights Act are exempt if they are "not in fact open to the public, except to the
extent that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers
or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section." 42
U.S.C. § 2000-a(e). Subsection (b) applies the 1964 Act against establishments
which serve the public and whose operations affect commerce, or whose
discrimination and/or segregation of the disabled is supported by State action. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b) (1994). This list includes:
(1) any inn, hotel, motel, or other establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests, other than an establishment located within a building
which contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence;
(2) any restaurant, cafeteria, lunchroom, lunch counter, soda fountain, or
other facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the
premises, including, but not limited to, any such facility located on the
premises of any retail establishment; or any gasoline station; (3) any
motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other
place of exhibition or entertainment; and (4) any establishment (A)(i)
which is physically located within the premises of any establishment
otherwise covered by this subsection, or (ii) within the premises of which is
physically located any such covered establishment, and (B) which holds
itself out as serving patrons of such covered establishment.
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with reference to the tax code, which exempts "[c]lubs organized
for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes,
substantially all the activities of which are for such purposes and
no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder."167
One of the first cases to address the private club exemption
was the Supreme Court's Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.1
68
Although the case turned on whether the grant of a liquor license
gave the color of state action to an otherwise private entity, the
court enumerated several factors that led to a determination of
private club status. 169 These included well-defined membership
requirements, private ownership of the facilities, the absence of
public funding, exclusive admission to the grounds and exclusivity
in conferring membership. 70
Nearly a decade later, in Tilman v. Wheaton-Haven
Recreation Ass'n, Inc.,171 the Court reviewed a swimming pool
association's claim of "private club" status in determining whether
the plaintiffs civil rights had been violated. The Court denied an
exemption for the pool association in part because membership
decisions were racially motivated decisions thinly disguised as
relying on geographic proximity to the pool and status as a
homeowner. 172
The Ninth Circuit uses similar factors to determine private
status. Looking to EEOC Guidelines interpreting Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court recently articulated a "private
167. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1999). The exact language of Title I exempts from
coverage any "bona fide membership club (other than a labor organization) that is
exempt from taxation under 501(c) of Title 26." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(ii) (1994).
26 U.S.C. § 501(c) enumerates 27 separate lists of exemptions describing entities
that are not subject to federal taxation. The section addressing "bona fide
membership clubs" defines said entities as "[c]lubs organized for pleasure,
recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all the activities of
which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder." 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(7) (1999). The tax code,
interestingly, also exempts "professional football leagues... not organized for
profit and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual." 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) (1999).
168. 407 U.S. 163 (1965).
169. See id. at 171.
170. See id. The private nature of the Moose Lodge was a fact stipulated by the
parties, see id. at 179 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and the Court did not explore
these "private club" elements in depth.
171. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
172. See id. at 436-39. The association allowed membership privileges to every
White person within the geographic area, subject to no restrictions save for a
maximum number of members. See id. at 438.
20001
Law and Inequality
membership club" test. 173 This test required proof that the entity
"(1) is a club in the ordinary sense of the word, (2) is private, and
(3) requires meaningful conditions of limited membership." 174
Factors to consider included non-profit goals, selective
membership requirements based on personal qualifications,
limited accessibility to club facilities and services, absence of paid
or general advertising, and member control of the club and its
assets. 175
Under these precedents, and relying on the plain language of
the statute, as opposed to remedial purpose interpretation, the
PGA Tour must be considered a private club. First, the PGA Tour
does not provide services to the public. It is a non-profit
corporation that organizes professional sporting events. The
competitors are independent contractors who win prize money
supplied by independent corporate sponsors. A substantial portion
of the sponsorship money is directed to charity. Second,
membership in the organization is highly selective and based on
quantifiable criteria that do not carry any indicia of discriminatory
purpose. Third, the area of competition within which members
compete is highly delineated and exclusive-the public is not
allowed within the boundaries of play. Finally, the PGA Tour
operates with minimal contribution from public-generated funds,
and the monies collected do not inure to the benefit of any private
shareholder.
The district court's holding that the PGA Tour cannot claim
the private club exemption is suspect when viewed under the
above textualist analysis. 176 One factor the lower court found
weighed against private club status actually lends credence to the
PGA Tour's exemption argument. The district court misapplied
the Landsdowne "use of facilities by nonmembers" factor. 77 The
district court's analysis relied on Smith v. YMCA, 178 which found
that a YMCA that "enjoyed a substantial amount of revenue from
173. See Richard v. Friar's Club, 124 F.3d 212, No. 96-55614, 1997 WL 579146
(9th Cir. Sept. 18, 1997).
174. Id. at *1 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1989)).
175. See id.
176. Although the district court applied out-of-circuit precedent from another
district court, see supra Part I.A. (discussing the Martin courts application of the
Landsdowne factors), these Landsdowne factors echo those articulated by the
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit.
177. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1325 (D. Or.
1998).
178. 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972).
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the general public" was not a private club.179 The PGA Tour,
however, does not allow non-members access to the area of
competition. The area of revenue-generation on which the district
court based its analysis is the same area that is unquestionably
subject to the ADA.180 Using this already compliant area to
impose liability on a questionably covered and possibly exempt
area is inappropriate.
Further supporting private club status for the PGA Tour is
an exception to the private club exemption. The exception is made
"to the extent that" the facilities of an exempt entity are made
available to the public and affect interstate commerce. 181
Therefore, if the PGA Tour is an exempt entity, it must still
comply with the ADA in whatever areas the public is given access.
The inverse proposition supported by such language is that
making a section of an exempt entity's facilities open to the public
does not negate the exemption in full, but only to such an extent as
is necessary to protect customers or patrons. The implications ofimposing public accommodation status only on the area in fact
open to the public will be further addressed under the place of
public accommodation analysis in Part IV.D.182
C. Fundamental Alterations
Title III of the ADA allows covered entities a defense to
claims of discrimination by disallowing modifications that would
affect or "fundamentally alter" the nature of the goods or services
provided. 8 3 It also provides that entities need not remove barriers
179. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325 (discussing Smith, 462 F.2d at 648).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994) (enumerating a list of entities considered
places of public accommodation, and specifically mentioning golf courses). If the
disposition of Martin were predicated on the area outside the lines of competition,
the result would be laughably easy, for the ADA demands that areas accessible to
the public comply with its requirements.
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b) (1994).
182. See infra notes 203-217 and accompanying text.
183. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994) (stating that discrimination
includes "a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford... accommodations to
individuals with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations"). The Supreme Court has
noted that the disabled are entitled to wide-sweeping and far-ranging remedial
measures, even to the point of "affirmative" acts. See School Bd. of Nassau County
v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1986) ('Employers have an affirmative obligation
to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee."). Although
Arline deals with the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA states that its prohibitions and
mandates are to be read as giving the disabled no fewer protections than those
afforded by the Rehabilitation Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201 (1994).
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to access unless the change is "readily achievable," and that the
provision of auxiliary aids or services is not required if doing so
would create an "undue burden."18 4 Crucial to an analysis of these
terms is whether a modification is "reasonable." Although Title III
does not define what modifications are reasonable nor what
alterations are fundamental, 185 Title I sheds some light on the
terminology, providing that discrimination includes the failure to
provide a "reasonable accommodation" (defined as including the
modification of equipment, devices, examinations, training
materials or policies and other similar accommodations),1 6 unless
providing the accommodation would impose an "undue hardship
184. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1998) (defining readily achievable and undue
burden); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302 (1998) (describing appropriate modifications in policies,
practices or procedures, but declining to define fundamental alteration).
Interestingly, although the regulations choose to define both "readily achievable"
and "undue burden," the statute only defines the former. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181
(1994). In addition, even though the same factors are used to examine both terms,
the regulations envision a lower standard of review for what is readily achievable
(dealing with the removal of barriers) than for what constitutes an undue burden
(dealing with the provision of auxiliary aids and services). Compare 42 U.S.C. §
12181(9) (1994) and 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (defining readily achievable as "easily
accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense")
(emphasis added) with 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (defining undue burden as involving
"significant difficulty or expense") (emphasis added). "Significant" implies a lower
standard than "substantial," but a higher standard than the somewhat intangible
"much." Where fundamental alteration falls is difficult to determine. See infra
note 185. See also DOJ Technical Assistance Manual for Title III, § 111-4.3600
(1990) available in RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
HANDBOOK 375, 380, (2nd ed. 1999) ("[Tjhe undue burden standard... requires a
greater level of effort by a public accommodation in providing auxiliary aids and
services than does the readily achievable standard for removing barriers in existing
facilities.").
185. Title III does not define "fundamental alteration," although the Title I
equivalent of "undue hardship" covers any "action requiring significant difficulty or
expense" when considered in light of the cost of the accommodation and the
resources of the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994). The DOJ Technical
Assistance Manual for Title III attempts to define fundamental alteration as "a
modification that is so significant that it alters the essential nature of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations offered." § III-
4.3600.
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1994). An employer that falls under the scope of
Title I must make "reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an
applicant or employee, unless such... accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of the business." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (1994).
"Reasonable accommodation" is defined to include making access available to all
parts of the workplace, modifying job tasks or schedules, providing machinery,
training materials, or interpreters, and "other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). An "undue hardship" on the
employer is described as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense"
when considered in light of the cost of the accommodation and the resources of the
employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
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on the entity."18 7
The Supreme Court has spoken infrequently on Title III of
the ADA.188 The Court has, however, ruled on what may
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Part of the confusion stems from the
statute's three different uses of the term "accommodation." First, an
accommodation is a device designed to assist a disabled individual perform the
essential functions of the position they hold or desire. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
Second, an accommodation is a type of service or benefit provided to the public. See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (using accommodation in a list with "goods, services,
facilities, privileges, [and] advantages"). Third, a public accommodation is a place
that is open to the public. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (using accommodation as part
of the phrase "place of public accommodation"). Reasonable modification is in line
with the first use of accommodation, in that it is a device designed to assist
individuals to access the services or benefits of a place of public accommodation. A
reasonable modification, therefore, under the interpretive canon of statutes in pari
materia, should be construed under the same standard as reasonable
accommodation. See also John W. Parry, Public Accommodations Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability,
MENTAL & PHYsICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 92, 92-93 (Jan./Feb. 1992) (explaining that
Title III "in no way lessens the reach of existing federal laws or regulations").
188. The only Title III case to date in the Supreme Court is Bragdon v. Abbott,
524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Bragdon, however, did not deal with any
issues exclusive to Title III. The two holdings of the case were that HIV was an
impairment that substantially limited the plaintiffs major life activity of
reproduction, and that an entity claiming a direct threat defense must have a
subjective belief, based on objective medical evidence, that a significant risk of
harm exists. See id. at 2215-16. It would seem, however, that additional Supreme
Court decisions on Title III will soon be forthcoming (including, possibly, Martin),
as the Court began reviewing ADA issues in the summer of 1998. See
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that the
protections of Title II (public entities) applied to a state prison population) (decided
June 15); Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2196 (decided June 25). See also Wright v.
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998) (construing a collective
bargaining agreement arbitration clause and holding that the clause's general
language did not preclude the plaintiffs federal suit) (decided November 16). In
the summer of 1999, the Court added five more ADA decisions. In Cleveland v.
Policy Management Sys., 119 S. Ct. 1957 (1999), the Court wiped away a three-
cornered circuit split on the issue of whether judicial estoppel applied to a
plaintiffs inconsistent representations with respect to disabled status. The Court
held that an individual's representations for the purpose of Social Security benefits
are not a per se bar to recovery under the ADA, and do not even invoke a
presumption against the plaintiff. See id. Instead, the plaintiff must carry a
normal burden of production and persuasion, and must therefore explain away the
inconsistent representations under a normal burden analysis. See id. This was the
most liberal of the competing circuit positions, and, coincidentally, the one
advocated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See id. In
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999), the Court looked at
whether the definition of disability should take mitigating measures into account.
The Court, resolving a contentious circuit split, held that the ADA demands an
individualized inquiry into the existence of a disability, and that the only way to
effect such an inquiry is to consider an individual's mitigating measures. See id.
Under this ruling, an individual with diabetes, or epilepsy, must be considered in
his or her medicated state when determining whether he or she is disabled-the
Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to create a situation where courts
are predicting what an impairment "might do" to an individual were the individual
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constitute a "reasonable accommodation" in other situations.189
With regard to an employment claim, the Court in School Board of
Nassau County v. Arline9o said that courts must make "an
individualized inquiry" into the facts to determine whether a
proposed accommodation is reasonable.191 It went on to state that
an "accommodation is not reasonable if it either imposes undue
financial and administrative burdens on a grantee, or requires a
fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program."192 In
another case, the Court noted that a disabled individual "must be
provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee
offers," and that such access may mandate some "reasonable
accommodations." 193 However, a "fundamental alteration in the
nature of a program" is not required by any "statute or
regulations" implementing the Act. 194
The distillation of the Arline and Choate precedent leads to a
not using corrective measures. See id. Since the ADA demands an individualized,
"present tense" inquiry, any supposition as to what the individual's disability
"might be" when stripped of the mitigating measure is counter to the purpose of the
ADA. See id. The Court applied similar reasoning to the particular facts of
Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999) and Albertson's v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999), holding that the respective plaintiffs were not
entitled to relief. The Court rounded out its summer of ADA review with a Title II
decision. See Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 1131 (1999) (holding in the context of
Title II that institutionalization of individuals with mental disabilities may, under
some circumstances, rise to the level of discrimination).
189. These other contexts serve to illuminate the concept of "reasonable
accommodation," including: that an interpretation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
fresh start provision need not be a "microscopically fair [accommodation] ... of the
competing interests of fairness, administrability, and avoidance of abuse," Atlantic
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 523 U.S. 382, 550 (1998); that
the "authorization of religious discrimination with respect to nonreligious activities
goes beyond reasonable accommodation," Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 343 (1987) (referencing Lenwn v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)); and that "an accommodation causes undue
hardship whenever that accommodation results in more than a de minimus cost to
the employer," Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
190. 480 U.S. 273 (1986).
191. See id. See also Milani, supra note 120, at 869 (proposing that courts
should follow Johnson v. Florida High School Activities Ass'n, 899 F. Supp. 579
(M.D. Fla. 1996) (arguing the courts should conduct an individualized inquiry to
determine if waiving a rule causes a fundamental alteration to an interscholastic
athletic program)).
192. Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 (internal quotations and citations omitted)
(referring to 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1985) for a list of factors to consider).
193. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985) (discussing Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)).
194. Choate, 469 U.S. at 300. The Court cited to 45 C.F.R. § 84 for examples of
reasonable modifications, which included making building alterations to create
access and giving time extensions for educational requirements. See Choate, 469
U.S. at 301 n.21.
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two-part analysis. First, the proposed modification to the practice
or policy (i.e. the accommodation) must be reasonable, and not
impose an undue burden. Second, the proposed modification
cannot work a fundamental alteration of the nature of the goods or
program. Martin's proposed accommodation of a golf cart is
reasonable and does not impose an undue burden. It does,
however, work a fundamental alteration of the nature of
professional competition. Golf, from its inception, has always
required that its competitors walk the course. 195 PGA Tour rules
require that competitors walk the course regardless of weather,
injury or the number of holes traversed in a day of competition. 96
Furthermore, walking injects an element of fatigue into the
competition. 197 If the fatigue element was absent, then every
professional event would be a "silly season" "skills challenge." 198
Just as stores are not required to alter their inventory for disabled
individuals, 199 book stores are not required to stock brailled
books 200 and museums are not required to allow the touching of
195. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250-52 (D.
Or. 1998) (discussing the Rules of Golf and testimony for and against the PGA
Tour's walking mandate). The idea that walking is an integral part of the game
was a central aspect of the PGA Tour's argument against allowing Martin a cart.
See id. Several storied players have spoken out on behalf of the PGA Tour in this
regard, including Ken Venturi, Arnold Palmer, Paul Azinger and Tom Watson. See
Craig Weber, Pros Shouldn't Hold Golfer's Handicap Against Him, THE STAR-
LEDGER, June 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3426007. On Martin's behalf,
arguing the opposite, sits one lonely Nike Tour player, Eric Johnson. See Martin II,
994 F. Supp. at 1251 nn.12-13. The United States Golf Association, which allowed
Martin a cart for its U.S. Open, filed an amicus brief supporting the PGA Tour's
position, much to Martin's dismay. See Harry Blauvelt, Martin Disappointed by
USGA Action, USA TODAY, Aug. 26, 1998, at 12C.
196. See Martin H, 994 F. Supp. at 1249.
197. See Olinger v. United States Golf Ass'n, No. 3:98-CV-252RM, 1999 WL
454719 *1, *8-*9 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (finding fatigue a fundamental aspect of
professional competition).
198. After the end of the regular PGA Tour season, several "made for television"
events are scheduled by independent entities that feature high payouts and
unusual formats. This two-month period is derisively referred to as the "silly
season." See, e.g., Dave Shelburne, Prime-Time Golf Gets its Fair Share, LA.
DAILY NEWS (August 4, 1999) (describing a television-created showdown between
Tiger Woods and David Duval, the top two golfers in the world rankings, as a "get-
rich opportunity similar to many events played during golfs post-Mour 'silly
season' from November to January"); Ron Sirak, Silly Season I, GOLFWEB,
November 11, 1997 (visited October 12, 1999)
<http://services.golfweb.com/library/sirak/golfnotes97111 l.html> (quoting golf
professional Peter Jacobsen as saying that "Silly Season is a silly term created by a
jealous media"). One of these "silly" events is a "skills challenge," where high-
profile players pit their driving, iron, and putting skills against each other. This
event does not involve walking as a condition of competition.
199. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a) (1998).
200. See 28 C.F.R. Part 36 App. B. § 36.302 (1998).
200
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artifacts, 201 professional golf is not required to accommodate an
individual who cannot meet the essential physical requirements of
professional competition. 202
D. Places of Public Accommodation
A final issue in the ADA's application to professional sports is
the definition of "places of public accommodation." The ADA
defines the term to include places of exhibition or entertainment,
places of public gathering, sales or rental establishments, places of
public display or collection and places of exercise or recreation. 203
201. See id.
202. Besides, how can one justify allowing an individual competitor the
accommodation of a motorized cart when professional golfers are not even allowed
the assistance of a towel on the ground to kneel on, for fear that they may be
"building a stance?" See UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note *, at Rule
13-3, 162 ("A player is entitled to place his feet firmly in taking a stance, but he
shall not build a stance."); id. at Decision 13-3/2, 180 ("Q[uestion]. A player's ball
was under a tree in such a position that he found it expedient to play his next
stroke while on his knees. Because the ground was wet, the player placed a towel
on the ground at the spot where his knees would be situated so that the knees of
his trousers would not get wet. He then knelt on the towel and played his stroke.
Was the player subject to penalty under Rule 13-3 for building a stance? A[nswer].
Yes."). This actually happened to a PGA Tour competitor:
Stadler won the 1982 Masters, but is perhaps best remembered for being
disqualified in the 1987 San Diego Open because he kneeled on a towel to
hit a ball from under a small pine tree on the 14th hole at Torrey Pines
Golf Course. Stadler has the reputation of not being fussy about his
appearance - "It's hard to dress this body" - but used the towel because
the tournament was on TV and he was wearing light blue slacks and
"didn't want to finish the round looking like a gardener." A television
viewer in Iowa telephoned the tournament and said Stadler had violated
the rule against "building a stance." Rules officials agreed and approached
him after he had signed his scorecard. Because he had signed an incorrect
card, he was disqualified. In 1995, Torrey Pines cut down the tree and
gave Stadler the final whacks. "People still come up to me like it happened
yesterday," he said.
Craig Smith, Stadler Still Stands Out, SEATTLE TIMES, July 25, 1999.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (providing that "[n]o individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any
place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation"). "Public accommodation" is defined as
an entity whose operations affect commerce, and includes:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an
establishment located within a building that contains not more than five
rooms for rent or hire and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of
such establishment as the residence of such proprietor; (B) a restaurant,
bar, or other establishment serving food or drink; (C) a motion picture
house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment; (D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other
place of public gathering; (E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store,
hardware store, shopping center, or other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel
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The Supreme Court's decision in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
Irvis204 refers to the myriad reasons supporting a broad reading of
"place of public accommodation" as described in the Civil Rights
Act. Although the Court's opinion primarily explored the
relationship between interstate commerce and the facility in
question, it also affirmed the validity of a broad construction of the
statute to combat discrimination. 205 When the Court subsequently
revisited the "place of public accommodation" definition a few
years later, it found that a place of recreation which served food to
visitors fell within the Civil Rights Act.206
A recent decision in the Ninth Circuit is in accord with the
Supreme Court's definition of the Civil Rights Act's "place of public
accommodation." The Ninth Circuit in Clegg v. Cult Awareness
Network20 7 dealt directly with a membership organization and
service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an
accountant or lawyer, pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a
health care provider, hospital, or other service establishment; (G) a
terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or
collection; (I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation; (J)
a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education; (K) a day care center, senior citizen
center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption agency, or other social
service center establishment; and (L) a gymnasium, health spa, bowling
alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation.
42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994). Compare the list of covered entities under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, see supra note 166 and accompanying text, specifically referred
to by the ADA for methods of determining exempt status under Title III.
204. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
205. See id.
206. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). The entity in question, a privately
owned recreational facility, attempted to hold itself out as a private club, even to
the point of selling memberships to White visitors for twenty-five cents. The Court
stated that there could be "no serious doubt that a substantial portion of the food
served has moved in interstate commerce." Id. at 305. In addition, the snack bar's
'status as a covered establishment automatically brings the entire... facility
within the ambit of Title I" proscriptions. Id. As an alternative ground, the Court
broadly read the statute to find the facility to be a place of public accommodation as
a place of recreation. See id. at 307-08. The Court based this reading on the Civil
Rights Act's broadly stated purpose of removing "the daily affront and humiliation
involved in discriminatory denials of access to facilities ostensibly open to the
general public." Id. (citation omitted).
A recent Supreme Court decision passed up an excellent opportunity to speak on
the subject of places of public accommodation, forsaking analysis and instead
relying on the plain language of the statute to find that a dentist's office falls under
the Title III of the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998). Although the Court's finding is unassailable, and obviously justified by
explicit language in the ADA, the Court failed to provide any meaningful precedent
for determining place of public accommodation status. See id.
207. 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994). The court stated that reliance on plain
meaning in the definition of place of public accommodation "is in full accord" with
Daniel, 395 U.S. at 307-08, which holds the Civil Rights Act applicable in relation
20001
Law and Inequality
pointed out that the Civil Rights Act operates against "places,
lodgings, facilities and establishments open to the public."208 This
means that "place of public accommodation" language can apply to
organizations only when they are "affiliated with a place open to
the public and membership in the organization is a necessary
predicate to use of the facility."209 Therefore, both a textual
analysis and Supreme Court precedent reveal that the PGA Tour's
area of competition is not a place of public accommodation under
both the plain language of the ADA and under the Department of
Justice implementing regulations.
This is true even under the Supreme Court's broad
construction of "place of public accommodation," because in those
cases where the Court has held an entity is covered under the
statutory language, the area found to be a place of public
accommodation invariably served the public.21 0 This "serve the
public" limitation has led to a distinction in the Ninth Circuit
between places of public accommodation and membership
organizations under Title II of the Civil Rights Act.2 11 Although
the ADA extends its reach beyond that of the Civil Rights Act by
adding the words "by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation," 212 the plain language of
the ADA cannot reach the PGA Tour's area of competition, since it
does not serve customers or clients within this restricted-access
area.
Department of Justice regulations support this interpretation
by specifically allowing for "mixed use" facilities.2 13 "Mixed use"
to "facilities ostensibly open to the general public." Clegg. 18 F.3d at 755. See also
supra note 206 and accompanying.text.
208. Clegg, 18 F.3d at 756.
209. Id. The court referenced the plain language of the statute, and decided that
"it is clear Congress' intent in enacting Title II was to provide a remedy only for
discrimination occurring in facilities or establishments serving the public: to
conclude otherwise would obfuscate the term "place" and render nugatory the
examples Congress provides to illuminate the meaning of that term." Id. at 755.
The court cited for support Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Ant., 993 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th
Cir. 1993) (demanding an "ordinary meaning" reading of the statute) and Ardestani
v. 1.N.S., 502 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1991) (stating that the "strong presumption that the
plain language of the statute expresses congressional intent is rebutted only in rare
and exceptional circumstances, when a contrary legislative intent is clearly
expressed") (internal quotations omitted).
210. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Daniel, 395 U.S. at 298.
211. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the Ninth Circuit's construction of "place of
public accommodation").
212. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994).
213. 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.104 (1998). The Ninth Circuit must defer to
the regulations implementing the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, -,
[Vol. 18:131166
2000] DRIVING IN THE FAIRWAY
denotes facilities wherein a portion is a "public accommodation."214
The regulations use as an example a private movie studio that
makes tours available to the public.215 Such an entity would be
subject to the ADA only as to the area actually open to the
public.216 Inversely, a public accommodation may have within
itself a section that remains an exempt area.21 7 This construction
of the ADA's language does not conflict with prior Supreme Court
holdings because the Supreme Court has only applied the place of
public accommodation language to areas actually serving the
public. Supreme Court precedent and DOJ regulations, when
taken together, lead to a determination that the PGA Tour
operates a place of public accommodation with respect to those
areas of the golf course to which the public is an invitee, but that
the area of competition, where the public is neither invited nor
allowed, remains a private enclave to which the ADA does not
apply.
V. Removing Our Supreme Court-Supplied Textualist-
Colored Lenses Brings to Light a More Appropriate
Remedial Interpretation of the ADA
Part IV of this Article argued that under a narrow-visioned
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, the ADA's "place of
public accommodation" language does not apply to professional
sports. Concededly, when viewed in that harsh lighting, Martin's
118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998) (stating that although "friesponsibility for
administering the Rehabilitation Act was not delegated to any single entity,. . . we
need not pause to inquire whether this causes us to withhold deference to agency
interpretations under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984). It is enough to observe that the well-reasoned views of the
agencies implementing the statute 'constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.') (quoting
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944)).
214. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. B, § 36.104.
215. See id. The regulations specifically explain the movie studio example thus:
If a tour of a commercial facility that is not otherwise a place of public
accommodation, such as... a movie studio production set, is open to the
general public, the route followed by the tour must be operated in
accordance with the rule's requirements for public accommodations. The
place of public accommodation defined by the tour does not include those
portions of the commercial facility that are merely viewed from the tour
route.
Id. The Interpretive Guidance further explains that "in a large hotel that has a
residential apartment wing, the residential wing would not be covered by the
ADA." Id.
216. See id.
217. See Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698,
758-60 (D. Or. 1997).
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case does seem'to weaken significantly. The more appropriate
analysis, however, favors effectuating congressional intent, which
means construing the ADA broadly to implement its remedial
purpose.
This Part responds to the major issues of Martin v. PGA
Tour, Inc. that were addressed in Part IV, and applies a broad-
based remedial purpose analysis to their resolution. This remedial
purpose interpretation refutes Part IV's limited analytical
perspective with regard to the construction of the private club
exemption, the fundamental alteration defense, and the place of
public accommodation definition. It does not succumb to the
district court's sometimes haphazard method of review, but rather
provides a reasoned interpretation that carries an implied
argument in favor of shedding the textualist-colored lenses which
the Supreme Court has worn in recent opinions.
A. Major Life Activities
Martin undisputedly qualifies as disabled under the ADA.
Applying the Supreme Court's own statute-derived three-part test,
Martin has an impairment that substantially limits a major life
activity. 215 The Ninth Circuit agrees with the application of the
Supreme Court test, as noted in its recent decision in Mustafa v.
Clark County School District.219 Although Mustafa dealt with the
employment context, the court recognized that the disability test
used in Bragdon applies to all five discrimination-prohibiting
chapters of the ADA. 220 The circuit court therefore applied a
three-pronged test that evaluated first whether the plaintiff was
disabled, second whether a "major life activity" was affected, and
third whether the limitation on the major life activity was
substantial.2 2 1 As noted in Part IV, Martin has a physical
218. See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2202. See also Sutton v. United Airlines, 119
S.Ct. 2139 (1999) (explaining in great detail the definition of disabled, but refusing
in dicta to hold on the level of deference courts should show agency regulations
implementing the ADA's definition, and questioning in an aside whether "working"
can be reconciled conceptually with the balance of the enumerated life activities);
supra note 188 (explaining 1999 Supreme Court decisions regarding the use of
mitigating measures when determining disabled status).
219. 157 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 1998).
220. See id.
221. See id. Other Ninth Circuit decisions support the application of this test,
although all deal with the employment context, and not with places of public
accommodation. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir.
1997) (holding a lifting restriction of 25 pounds was not severely debilitating
enough to constitute a substantial limitation on a major life activity, since many
health-related jobs remained available to plaintiff); Kirkingburg v. Albertson's,
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impairment that substantially limits his major life activity of
walking as compared to an average member of the general
population. 222 He therefore meets the threshold requirement of
disability as described by the ADA, and is entitled to its
protections.
B. Private Club Exemption
Integral to the determination of the PGA Tour's status as a
private club are equally important facts that lead to diametrically
opposed outcomes. On the one hand, the PGA Tour is a non-profit
organization that generates many millions of dollars for charity.
On the other hand, the PGA Tour is premised on generating
substantial monies from sponsors for the benefit of its player-
members. The purpose of the private club exemption, however, is
to protect the freedom of private association amongst individuals.
In accord with this concept is the ADA's focus on entities that
affect interstate commerce and its refusal to impose its mandates
on private individuals.223 The PGA Tour cannot be described as a
protected private association of individuals, and its operations
ineluctably affect interstate commerce. Therefore, the PGA Tour
cannot claim exemption as a private club.
The private club factors enumerated by the Supreme Court,
when used to implement the purpose of the ADA as intended by
Congress, support this determination. First, part of the revenue
generated by the PGA Tour comes from public sources. Admission
fees are charged for the privilege of viewing events from the
grounds of the course itself, and the rights to televise individual
events are sold to television studios for a hefty price. 224 Further
income is generated from the sale of PGA Tour-licensed
Inc., 143 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999)
(finding an individual with limited vision in one eye substantially disabled in the
major lif activity of seeing under the ADA); Stratton v. Hawaii Elec. Light Co., 108
F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding relief under the ADA unavailable to disabled
plaintiff because limitation was not substantial and many other fields of
employment remained available to her).
222. See supra note 10 (elaborating on Martin's physical impairment).
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4) (1994) (invoking the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to regulate commerce, in order to combat
discrimination against the disabled).
224. See, e.g., Earl Daniels, Popular Moves for PGA Tour: Goal is to Keep Game
Growing, FLA-TIMES UNION, March 28, 1999, at C20 (commenting that the PGA
Tour Championship received 12 hours of live coverage for the first two rounds of
competition, an unprecedented amount, and noting that "[m]aximizing the PGA
Tour's visibility via TV... is [one] mission of the PGA Tour").
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merchandise.22 5  Second, the PGA Tour does not stage its
competitions on its own private facilities, exclusive of the public,
but rather cooperates with existing golf courses, both public and
private, in the presentation of events. Finally, participation in
professional competitions is not restricted exclusively to members
of the PGA Tour. To the contrary, all events allow the public onto
the general grounds as spectators. All events allow the public to
volunteer as marshals, and these marshals are allowed within the
lines of competition. All events also allow non-members such as
security personnel, photographers, and caddies within the lines of
competition. Furthermore, all PGA Tour events allow non-
member competitors, including foreign players, amateur players,
and sponsor-invited players to compete side-by-side with PGA
Tour members.2 26
The Ninth Circuit's articulation of the private club exemption
further counsels against private club status for the PGA Tour.
First, the PGA Tour advertises each individual competition both
nationally and locally. It also invests substantial money into
general advertising, most recently with its "these guys are good"
media campaign.227 Second, membership in the PGA Tour is not
based on personal characteristics, but rather on various methods
of skills evaluation, including finishing in the top fifteen on the
money list of the Nike Tour and finishing in the top 35 of the PGA
Tour Qualifying School.228 Finally, the PGA Tour is not a club in
the ordinary sense of the word. Black's Law Dictionary defines
225. See Daniels, supra note 224 (explaining that the PGA Tour plans to raise as
much money as they can "through streams of revenue generated from media rights,
golf tournaments, sponsorship deals and fees from the network of Tournament of
Players Club courses and retail licensing agreements").
226. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (D. Or.
1998).
227. The PGA Tour has invested substantial monies into this media campaign,
recruiting big-name stars from other sports, and investing in high-tech special
effects, in an effort to promote its competitions. Some recent television
advertisements have shown Phil Mickelson chipping an alley-cop pass to Patrick
Ewing in the final seconds of a basketball game and John Daly launching a pinch-
hit home run in the final inning of a baseball game. Each advertisement ends with
a nationally recognized star from the sport in question who exclaims "these guys
are good!"
228. PGA Tour member-players can gain their "right' to play on the PGA Tour
through several methods, but chiefly through a three-stage qualifying tournament.
This tournament is both exacting and exhausting. Commonly referred to as "Q-
school," it consists of a 72-hole first stage, a 72-hole second stage, and a 108-hole
third stage. After surviving all fourteen of these 18-hole rounds, the lowest 35
finishers plus ties are given playing cards for the regular PGA Tour. The next 70
lowest scores receive playing cards for the PGA Tour-sponsored Nike Tour. See
Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
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"club" to mean "a voluntary.., association of persons for common
purposes of a social, literary, investment, political nature, or the
like[,] ... especially one jointly supported and meeting
periodically, and membership is usually conferred by ballot and
carries [the] privilege of exclusive use of club quarters."229
Membership in the PGA Tour is not conferred by member vote,
does not presuppose meeting to advance a common purpose, and
does not result in access to some hallowed hall of antiquity.230 In
addition, the purpose of becoming a member is to play golf, while
the avowed purpose of the PGA Tour is the promotion of
entertainment and revenue-generation. 231
Other factors that detract from private club status for the
PGA Tour include those articulated by the district court.232 While
it is true that the district court's evaluation of the Lansdowne
factors is at times questionable, 233 it is, for the most part, a viable
interpretation of the facts.234  For example, the PGA Tour,
although highly competitive, cannot be said to be socially selective.
As the district court pointed out, the PGA Tour's eligibility
requirements measure skills, not values protected under freedom
of association. 235 If the PGA Tour's eligibility requirements made
it an exempt private club, then any other entity with quantitative
entrance requirements, like a university, would be so exempt.
Such an outcome is contradicted by the explicit language of the
ADA, which includes under its auspices any "undergraduate, or
postgraduate private school, or other place of education."236
Another determinative factor examined by the district court
that militates against private club status is the PGA Tour's
mercantile purpose.23 7 Analysis of the Title III exception is of little
help, since it does not look to membership organizations or their
purpose in applying the Civil Rights Act exemption, but rather to
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
229. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 259 (6th ed. 1996).
230. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text.
232. See Martin 1, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-26.
233. See supra notes 177-180 and accompanying text (taking issue with the
District Court's application of the "use of facilities by nonmembers" Landsdowne
factor).
234. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1324-26.
235. See id. at 1324.
236. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(J) (1994).
237. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325. A less weighty, but nonetheless
contributing factor against private club status examined by the district court was
the fact that the PGA Tour has extremely limited membership representation in
positions of executive authority. See id.
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accommodations of the place of public accommodation. 238 For this
reason, the private club exception to Title I is informative, in that
it applies the exemption to a membership organization only when
"no part of the net earnings... inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder."23 9 Although not shareholders, the player-members
of the PGA Tour are independent contractors who financially
benefit from the PGA Tour's efforts to promote, advertise and
create revenue for its product. 240 As the District Court pointed
out, "the nonprofit status of a corporation that exists to further the
commercial interests of its members does not weigh in favor of
exempt status."241 This for-profit status in relationship to its
members counsels that the PGA Tour does not meet the definition
of an exempt entity.
Finally, the arenas within which the PGA Tour conducts its
competitions are areas of public accommodation. The PGA Tour
does not own the golf courses on which its members compete, but
rather works in conjunction with existing course ownership to
stage events. These courses are not only then opened to the
public, but the public is also explicitly invited onto the grounds
through national and local advertising. Whether the PGA Tour is
a private club might therefore be moot, because even if it is a
private club, operating a place of public accommodation makes it
subject to the proscription against discrimination in Section 12182
of the ADA.242
C. Fundamental Alterations
The fundamental alteration defense is one way covered
entities may escape otherwise prohibitive burdens associated with
accommodating a disabled individual. Because fundamental
alteration is nowhere defined under the ADA, construction of the
term must rely on purpose, intent and case law. The Supreme
Court has explained in the context of the Rehabilitation Act (from
which the ADA borrows its terminology) that these remedial
statutes seek to ensure "evenhanded treatment and the
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(e) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-
a(b) (1994).
239. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1999).
240. See Martin I, 984 F. Supp. at 1325.
241. Id.
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) ("No individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns, leases... or operates a place of public
accommodation.") (emphasis added).
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opportunity for [disabled] individuals to participate in and benefit
from" services, programs or activities offered by covered entities. 243
However, this does not require alteration of the benefit "simply to
meet the reality that the [disabled] have greater medical needs."244
These statements support the idea that "courts must examine
the proposed alternative [accommodation] in light of the purposes
underlying the rule."245 If the purpose of the walking requirement
in the PGA Tour's rules is to inject fatigue into the competitive
equation, 246 then the PGA Tour (or at this stage, the court) must
conduct an individualized inquiry into the element of fatigue from
Martin's perspective. 247 The district court did exactly that in
finding that Martin experiences, even with the help of a cart, more
fatigue than able-bodied professional golfers during a round of
golf. 248 This factual finding, to which the Ninth Circuit must defer
unless clearly erroneous, 249 calls for a determination that allowing
Martin a golf cart is reasonable because it affords him no
advantage and therefore does not frustrate the underlying purpose
of the walking rule.
The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the ADA does not
define fundamental alterations and reasonable modifications, and
that "[a]s a result, a body of case law, rapidly growing, has sprung
up to provide further guidelines for the courts in this difficult
area."250 Although the Ninth Circuit has reviewed very few suits
involving Title 111,251 the circuit's lower courts have recently begun
243. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 288 (1985).
244. Id. at 303.
245. Milani, supra note 120, at 882.
246. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin 11), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1250 (D. Or.
1998).
247. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (1999) (holding
"whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry").
248. See id. at 1251-52.
249. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
250. Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 157 F.3d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1998).
251. According to the author's search of materials available in Westlaw, the
Ninth Circuit over a two year period spanning 1997-98 reviewed 84 cases originally
brought under the ADA, with 63 of them relating to employment discrimination
under Title I. While 16 cases were reviewed with Title II public service claims, only
five cases dealt with Title III place of public accommodation claims. All five of
those cases were unpublished dispositions. Of those five, Dowling v. MacMarin,
Inc., 156 F.3d 1236, 1998 WL 398386 (9th Cir. 1998) was considered moot; Sexton v.
Otis College of Art & Design Board of Directors, 129 F.3d 127, 1997 WL 697294 (9th
Cir. 1997) was time-barred; Haight v. Hawaii Pacific University, 116 F.3d 484,
1997 WL 330835 (9th Cir. 1997) failed for failure to state an injury; Scott v. Western
State University College of Law, 112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL 207599 (9th Cir. 1997)
failed to state a claim for which relief was available; and Norris v. Seattle
University School of Law, 112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL 205977 (9th Cir. 1997) failed to
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to deal with this section of the ADA.252 The sum result of this
expanding pool of cases is that "whether a particular
accommodation is reasonable depends on the circumstances of the
individual case."253
Because this case law fails to answer the question with any
clear legal guidelines, there can be no per se exclusion of a
requested accommodation. 54 The PGA Tour, contrary to its
argument, must therefore conduct an individualized inquiry into
the reasonableness of Martin's suggested accommodation.
Because the PGA Tour refused to make such an inquiry, it violated
the proscription against discrimination by failing to make a
reasonable modification to its policies and procedures. As a result,
the PGA Tour's fundamental alteration defense cannot be
advanced without first looking into the circumstances surrounding
the requested modification, and it therefore must fail for lack of
foundation.
A related issue is whether conducting an individualized
examination of the proposed accommodation imposes an undue
administrative burden on the reviewing entity.255 An undue
properly allege facts supporting the claim of disability. None dealt with the
definition of place of public accommodation or reasonable accommodation, other
than to say that a university is a place of public accommodation as described in 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)j) (1994), and that any modification of a school's educational
requirements to accommodate a disability would be a fundamental alteration of the
schoors services. See Norris, 1997 WL 205977 at *1; Scott, 1997 WL 207599 at *1
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1994); Southeastern Community College v.
Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 398-99 (1979)).
252. Most reported cases broaching the subject of Title III ADA claims in the
Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction have proceeded no further than the district court level.
See, e.g., Botosan v. Fitzhugh, 13 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Dunlap v.
Association of Bay Area Govts, 996 F. Supp. 962 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Chabner v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 994 F. Supp. 1185 (N.D. Cal. 1998); Independent
Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997); Cloutier v.
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal. 1997); Coalition of
Montanans Concerned with Disabilities v. Gallatin Airport Auth., 957 F. Supp.
1166 (D. Mont. 1997); Boemio v. Love's Restaurant, 954 F. Supp. 204 (S.D. Cal.
1997); Delil v. El Torito Restaurants, Inc., No. C94-3900-CAL, 1996 WL 807395
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 1996); Shultz v. Hemet Youth Pony League, Inc., 943 F. Supp.
1222 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Schaaf v. Association of Educ. Therapists, No. C 94-03315
CW, 1995 WL 381979 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1995); Arnold v. United Artists Theatre
Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994); Pinnock v. International House of
Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F. Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
253. Barnett, 157 F.3d at 748. See also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1486
(9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the determination of what constitutes reasonable
modification is highly fact-specific, requiring case-by-case inquiry").
254. But cf. Barnett, 157 F.3d at 748 (refusing, in a Title I case, to impose a per
se rule with regard to reasonable accommodations and collective bargaining
agreements, but also declining to require a "case-by-case" standard).
255. See supra note 192 and accompanying text; Milani, supra note 120, at 883-
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burden is something requiring significant difficulty or expense
when considered in light of the size of the entity, the extent of its
resources, and the cost of the accommodation. 256 The PGA Tour,
however, is an organization of considerable financial resources.
The cost of a golf cart is a minimal imposition on those resources.
In addition, the procedural burden of reviewing claims from
disabled individuals would be less than significant, considering the
small number of individuals who have developed abilities
commensurate with successful competition in professional golf.
257
Therefore, the individualized assessment of a reasonable
accommodation will create neither undue financial hardships nor
undue administrative burdens for the PGA Tour, and Martin
should be allowed the requested modification.
Assuming arguendo that the PGA Tour did conduct an
individualized inquiry, and self-determined that modifying its
rules to allow Martin the use of a cart would work a fundamental
alteration of the essential nature of professional competition, its
decision would nevertheless be subject to judicial review. Such
review, when articulated in a manner that implements
congressional intent and the remedial purpose of the ADA, further
counsels that Martin's requested accommodation would not be "a
modification that is so significant that it alters the fundamental
nature of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations offered."258  To use the Supreme Court's own
method of language interpretation, "fundamental" means "serving
as, or being an essential part of, a foundation or basis."259
"Essential" means either "absolutely necessary; indispensable," or
"a basic or necessary element."260 Walking a golf course is not a
basic element necessary to the essential nature of professional
golf. To the contrary, the PGA Tour itself allows the use of
motorized carts on its own Senior Tour, and effectively requires
89.
256. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (1994).
257. See Milani, supra note 120, at 890 (stating, in the context of age-waiver
petitions for high-school athletes, that even if the individualized review "were in
some way burdensome, the procedure will apply only in narrow circumstances:
when an athlete produces evidence that a physical or mental impairment caused
the delay in his education. Accordingly, such a waiver procedure cannot be an
undue burden because it will rarely occur.").
258. DOJ Technical Assistance Manual for Title III, § 111-4.3600 available in
RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK 375, 380, (2nd
ed. 1999) (defining fundamental alteration).
259. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 776 (1996).
260. Id. at 663.
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their use on its PGA Tour-owned golf courses.261 In addition, golf
by its very nature is scored by how many strokes are taken from
the tee to the green, not by how long it takes to move from one
shot to the next. Players are not penalized for taking an
inordinate amount of time walking to their ball, or for getting
there too quickly, but only for taking too much time once they have
reached the ball's general location.262 Walking, therefore, is not an
essential, basic element necessary to professional golf, and
Martin's proposed accommodation is not a fundamental alteration.
This conclusion is further bolstered by a variation of the
district court's disabled golfer hypothetical. 263 First, would the
PGA Tour exclude an otherwise capable professional golfer if the
individual required the assistance of crutches to move about the
golf course? Such an individual would still walk the course on her
or his own two legs. Taking the hypothetical one step further, if
this disabled individual later required the assistance of a
wheelchair, but remained competitive at a professional level,
would the PGA Tour refuse to allow her or him the opportunity to
compete simply because the individual's method of ambulation no
longer involved legs? Crutches and wheelchairs are methods of
assistance in the major life activity of walking, just as a motorized
golf cart is a method of assisting a disabled individual in the major
life activity of walking. Allowing one method of assistance
(crutches) necessarily demands the allowance of the others
(wheelchairs and carts). Martin's requested accommodation is
reasonable, does not impose an undue burden and does not
fundamentally alter the essential nature of professional golf.
D. Places of Public Accommodation
The final issue related to the ADA and professional sports is
in the definition of "places of public accommodation." Cases
261. See Seen & Heard, supra note 28, at 42 (noting that PGA Tour-owned
Tournament Players Championship golf courses require that players may not carry
their own bags, effectively resulting in a requirement that players rent a motorized
cart of some form).
262. See UNITED STATES GOLF ASSOCIATION, supra note *, at Rule 27, 429 ("A
ball is 'lose if... [iut is not found or identified as his by the player within five
minutes after the player's side or his or their caddies have begun to search for it.").
But see id. at Rule 6-7, 83 (The player shall play without undue delay."). Players
can be penalized for looking for a ball for more than five minutes, or for spending
too much time to actually make the stroke. In both circumstances, the clock doesn't
start ticking until the endeavor is started. Walking has no relationship to either
activity.
263. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (discussing the hypothetical
advanced by the District Court in Martin).
[Vol. 18:131
DRIVING IN THE FAIRWAY
construing the ADA and its place of public accommodation
language are, however, rare occurrences in the appellate courts,
and arguably serve to create a mere "result stare decisis," rather
than the more binding "rule stare decisis."26 4 This derives from a
lack of rule-development in analyzing "place of public
accommodation" and an emphasis on "I know it when I see it"
analysis.2 5  Such reasoning is readily apparent in recent
determinations of "place of public accommodation" that are made
by mere reference to the ADA's statutory language without
engaging in further analysis. 26 6 The end product of these cases is
a paucity of precedent in the field, which forces litigants to rely on
reasoning through analogy to other statutes like the
Rehabilitation Act and the Civil Rights Act.267
In the context of the Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court
recognized that a broad construction of remedial purpose statutes
264. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 F.2d
682, 691-92 (3d Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). The Casey court explained the
distinction in detail:
[Supreme Court opinions] usually include two major aspects. First, the
Court provides the legal standard or test that is applicable to laws
implicating a particular... provision. This is part of the reasoning of the
decision, the ratio decidendi. Second, the Court applies that standard or
test to the particular facts of the case that the Court is confronting-in
other words, it reaches a specific result using the standard or test. As a
lower court, we are bound by both the Supreme Court's choice of legal
standard or test and by the result it reaches under the standard or
test .... Our system of precedent or stare decisis is thus based on
adherence to both the reasoning and result of a case, and not simply to the
result alone. This distinguishes the American system of precedent,
sometimes called "rule stare decisis," from the English system, which
historically has been limited to following the results or disposition based
on the facts of the case and thus referred to as "result stare decisis."
Id.
265. Witness the indubitable obscenity cases, originally relegated to judicial
evaluation based on the quote referenced in the text. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I shall not today attempt further to
define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced [as obscene]; and perhaps
I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I know it when I see it, and the
motion picture in this case is not that.") (emphasis added).
266. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, -, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998)
(stating only that "[t]he term public accommodation is defined to include the
professional office of a health care provider") (internal quotations omitted); Scott v.
Western State Univ. College of Law, 112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL 207599, at *1 (stating,
without analysis, that "it is undisputed that [Washington State University] is a
'public accommodation' within the meaning of Title III of the ADA"); Norris v.
Seattle Univ. Sch. of Law, 112 F.3d 517, 1997 WL 205977, at *1 (stating that
Seattle University is "a public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the
ADA," but failing to further analyze the issue).
267. See, e.g., Crowder v. Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (9th Cir. 1996)
(looking to the Rehabilitation Act for guidance in construing the ADA with regard
to state animal-quarantine laws).
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(like the Civil Rights Act, the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA) is
necessary to effectively combat discrimination. The plain
language of the ADA, similar to the Civil Rights Act, reaches
places of exhibition or entertainment, places of public gathering,
sales or rental establishments, places of public display or collection
and places of exercise or recreation.268 The language of the ADA
also consciously extends beyond the scope of the Civil Rights Act to
include entities that lease or operate a place of public
accommodation.2 69 The language of the ADA is more expansive
than that of the Civil Rights Act, and it therefore demands an
even broader construction than that recognized by the Supreme
Court in the context of the earlier Act.
The PGA Tour conducts professional golf competitions on the
premises of ADA-covered golf courses. These golf courses, in
conjunction with the PGA Tour, invite the public's attendance in
exchange for an admission fee. The explicit language of the ADA
covers this public presentation of a professional competition, since
its description naturally falls under a "place of exhibition or
entertainment." The PGA Tour may also be said to operate a
"place of public gathering," and it arguably operates a place of
"recreation." All three of these impose place of public
accommodation status on the PGA Tour, and it therefore is subject
to the ADA's prohibition against discrimination. This is an
excellent example of a situation where plain language analysis
dovetails with both congressional intent and statutory purpose. In
such an instance, deference to the plain language without detailed
analysis is appropriate.
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (1994). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b) (1994) (defining
"place of public accommodation" as any "establishment which provides lodging to
transient guests," any "facility principally engaged in selling food for consumption
on the premises," or any "place of exhibition or entertainment" whose "operations
affect commerce" or are "supported by State action"). Examples in the Civil Rights
Act include inns, hotels and motels, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b)(1) (1994),
restaurants, cafeterias, lunchrooms, lunch counters and soda fountains, see 42
U.S.C. § 2000-a(b)(2) (1994, and motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls,
sports arenas and stadiums, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b)(3) (1994). Also included is
"any establishment which is physically located within the premises of any
establishment otherwise covered." 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b)(4)(i) (1994). For the entire
enumerated list see supra note 166.
269. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (1994) (stating that discrimination against
disabled individuals is prohibited in "any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation"). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(a) (1994) ("All persons shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation... without
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin.").
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The textualist reading of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
regulations detailed in Part IV.D. suggested that the ADA
envisions mixed-use facilities, like PGA Tour-operated golf
courses, where sections of the facility would remain exempt from
coverage. This argument is misleading. DOJ regulations suggest
that exempt entities that open a small portion of their facilities to
the public are subject to the ADA only in those areas. The
regulations do not envision the inverse proposition that covered
entities may establish a "safe harbor" of exempt area within a
covered area, and a broad-based remedial purpose reading of the
regulatory language cannot support such a proposition. This is
because the inclusion of small areas of coverage within larger
exempt areas furthers the purpose of the ADA by protecting the
public from discrimination within areas to which they have access.
The regulations do not speak to any exemptions, or "carve-outs,"
that would support the idea that an area from which the public is
excluded within a covered facility is exempt from coverage. To
read this into the regulations would confound the purpose of the
ADA, which is to provide protection to disabled individuals, not to
exclude private entities from coverage.
This conclusion is further bolstered by the ADA's Title III
DOJ Technical Assistance Manual, which states that "[i]f patients
receive medical services in the same building where the
administrative offices are located, the entire building is a place of
public accommodation, even if one or more floors are reserved for
the exclusive use of employees."270 The Civil Rights Act of 1964,
from which the ADA borrows its terminology, and to which it
refers for construction of remedies and exemptions, also supports
this finding, as it explicitly covers "any establishment which is
physically located within the premises of any establishment
otherwise covered."271 Golf courses are specifically covered as
places of public accommodation in Section 12181 of the ADA. 272
The PGA Tour operates its professional competitions on Title III-
covered golf courses, and invites the public onto the grounds.
Even assuming that the area of competition is outside of the public
purview, the entire area is subject to the ADA under the explicit
270. See ADA Title III DOJ Technical Assistance Manual 111-1.2000, available in
RUTH COLKER, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK 375, 380, (2nd
ed. 1999).
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000-a(b)(4)(i) (1994).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(L) (1994) (including "a gymnasium, heath spa,
bowling alley, golf course, or other place of exercise or recreation" within the 12
broad categories of private entities encompassed in the definition of a place of
public accommodation) (emphasis added).
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language of both the DOJ (which promulgates regulations
interpreting Title II and III of the ADA) and the Civil Rights Act
(upon which the ADA bases, its prohibitions).
Finally, the PGA Tour is not considered an "employer" under
the ADA because its player-members are independent
contractors. 273 It would negate the purpose and intent of the ADA
to allow a private entity to evade coverage simply by making all its
employees independent contractors. The ADA intends to cover any
entity that employs individuals or owns, leases or operates a place
of public accommodation. It goes so far as to encompass state
governmental entities, 274 up to and including penal institutions.
275
Exemptions are few and far between, and are designed to be
limited in scope. Despite any plain language textualist argument
that would ignore congressional intent,276 it is hard to fathom
protecting federal government officials and appointees (Title V),
the general public (Title III and Title II), prisoners (Title ID and
employees (Title I) from discrimination, while refusing to protect
individuals who make their living in a field that affects interstate
commerce, simply because they are arbitrarily classified as
independent contractors. Such a result is not only absurd, but is
also unconscionable under the ADA's findings and purpose.
Conclusion
Congress, in the Absence of a Remedial Purpose
Interpretation by the Courts, Must Legislate so that
Disabled Athletes are Allowed to Participate in the ADA's
Promise of Equal Opportunity
The privilege of "opportunity" alluded to by PGA Tour
Member Fred Couples at the beginning of this Article is the right
to compete as a professional golfer in PGA Tour-sponsored
events. 277 This "right" is afforded to an elite few based on the
ability to perform under pressure within a highly delineated yet
arbitrarily marked area of competition. 278 The PGA Tour limits
273. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp. 1320, 1323 (D. Or. 1998).
274. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12150 (1994) (covering Public Services).
275. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
276. See id. at 206.
277. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
278. Professional golf tournaments are conducted on both public golf courses and
on private country club golf courses. These golf courses must meet the playing
condition requirements of the PGA Tour (i.e. green speed, length of rough, hole
distance, etc.). Prize money awarded to the players is generated from private
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this "opportunity" to those individuals who can walk at least
eighteen holes per day, six days per week, during each week of
competition. 279 Recently, however, Casey Martin has challenged
PGA Tour rules that require walking as an integral part of golf.
The district court ruled in favor of Martin, granting him an
injunction that allows him the use of a motorized golf cart in PGA
Tour competitions. The PGA Tour appealed the decision to the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Under the current Supreme
Court's direction, the Ninth Circuit will likely rule against Martin,
favoring a narrow-visioned textualist analysis over a broad-based
remedial purpose analysis. A foreshadowing of this outcome can
be found in the Northern District of Indiana's Olinger v. United
States Golf Association.280 This Article, however, argues that
remedial purpose should prevail.
A decision favoring Martin effectuates congressional intent
and properly implements the remedial purpose of the ADA. Any
decision favoring the PGA Tour will have succumbed to the
textualist pressures of the current Supreme Court. The only
proper resolution in the absence of a decision favoring Martin, and
probably the only possible resolution under the Supreme Court's
limitations, is for Congress to amend the language of the ADA to
explicitly include professional sports. This is not an impossible
task, but rather seems eminently reasonable in light of recent
developments with regard to baseball's antitrust exemption. 28 1
"sponsoring" entities, and not the PGA Tour. The golf course, as a place of
competition, is itself open to public access, albeit under conditions of admission,
and for a significant fee. The area of competition is marked off by ropes, and
controlled by "marshals" (volunteers who contribute their time to the sponsoring
entity, and in return get to stand with the players "inside the lines"). The public is
denied access to this portion of the golf course. Typically, the ropes are attached to
whatever obstacles exist along the rough parallel to the fairway of each hole (i.e.
trees, shrubs, sprinkler control boxes, etc.), or to stakes placed in the ground.
These ropes are usually placed ten to fifteen yards from the fairway, conforming
roughly to the layout of the hole. See generally GEORGE PEPER, THE STORY OF GOLF
(1999); CARL PAULSON & LouIs H. JANDA, ROOKIE ON TOUR: THE EDUCATION OF A
PGA GOLFER (1999); JOHN FEINSTEIN, A GOOD WALK SPOILED: DAYS AND NIGHTS
ON THE PGA TOUR (1996).
279. Although a player-member need only compete in 15 events per year to
maintain voting rights, the tournament season runs 10 months, from February to
October, and membership renewal, absent certain exemptions, is based on
winnings against the field. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin I), 984 F. Supp.
1320, 1324-25 (D. Or. 1998). In other words, it behooves players to compete in
more events rather than fewer, and stamina, both physical and mental, is often an
issue for the players.
280. See supra notes 94-117 and accompanying text (discussing the Olinger
decision).
281. See Associated Press, Labor Antitrust Exemption Overturned (visited
October 28, 1998) <http://espn.sportszone.com/mlb/news/1998/981027/
20001
Law and Inequality
Congress, after more than seventy-five years of inaction,
overturned Federal Baseball Club, Inc. v. National League of
Professional Baseball ClubS2 82 through explicit legislative action,
making professional baseball vulnerable to antitrust sanctions. 28 3
This remedial event brought baseball back in line with all other
professional sports, and properly implemented public policy
disfavoring monopolies and restrictions on free trade.
And yet public policy that supports limiting restrictions of
trade and disfavoring monopolies cannot be construed as more
important than public policy that seeks the eradication of
discrimination. As the district court correctly noted, professional
sports organizations are "not so sacrosanct"25 ' as to be above the
law. To the contrary, they are subject to many federal statutes,
including federal labor relations and antitrust laws.
The purpose and intent of the ADA demand that Martin be
accommodated. It makes no difference to the language of the
statute whether the judicial branch or the legislative branch
implements its purpose. When a statute's purpose is as clear as
the ADA's, textualist-related concerns of enhancing judicial
economy and avoiding judicial legislating should acquiesce before
the clearly articulated remedial nature of the statute.
Finally, Casey Martin is a consummate shot-maker with
skills that rival those of PGA Tour members. Because PGA Tour
rules effectively bar Martin from competing professionally because
of his disability, not allowing him to compete in professional golf is
to discriminate against him because of that disability. The
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 prohibits such
discrimination, and Martin should therefore be allowed his
requested accommodation.
00905956.htm>. The bill that President Clinton signed into law only applies to
labor relations, and therefore is limited in scope by its own language and by Brown
v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996), which held that the NLRA takes
precedence over antitrust laws. See Associated Press, supra.
282. 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (holding that baseball games are purely state affairs,
are not engaged in interstate commerce, and are not subject to the antitrust acts);
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (stating after thirty years
of congressional inactivity, the courts must defer to stare decisis and ignore the fact
that baseball is engaging in interstate commerce); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972) (pointing out that although baseball's exemption from is an aberration, the
courts must defer to stare decisis and give effect to congressional inactivity).
283. See Associated Press, supra note 281 and accompanying text.
284. See Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc. (Martin II), 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or.
1998).
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